Categories
Vol. 67, No. 1 (Winter 2022-23)

“Your Books, Your Companions”

The words of the twelfth-century translator Judah ibn Tibbon in his ethical will to his son about books are well known:

I have honored you by providing an extensive library for your use, and have thus relieved you of the necessity to borrow books. Most students must bustle about to seek books, often without finding them. But you, thanks be to God, lend and borrow not. Many books, indeed, you own two or three copies. I have besides made for you books on all sciences, hoping that your hand might find them all as a nest.

Maybe less well known is the very next line: “But you, my son, did deceive my hopes. You did not choose to employ your abilities, hiding yourself from all your books, not caring to know them or even their titles.” Ibn Tibbon probably was not the first person to feel that others failed to appreciate their passion for books; he was certainly not the last. While the physicality of the book has gone through many changes, its essential nature as a repository of and vehicle for knowledge and teaching remains, whether the words are written on vellum, paper, or in digital format. That the editors of Masorti: The New Journal of Conservative Judaism have seen fit to include a book review section in this journal is testament to the centrality of the book and book learning to our movement and community.

In the continuation of Ibn Tibbon’s ethical will he wrote, “My son, make your books your companions and your garden; and your shelves and bookcases your orchards.” Scholar of medieval Spanish Jewry S. J. Pearce has pointed out that Ibn Tibbon’s statement is actually a modification of an earlier one by Dunash ben Labrat, who wrote, “Let your Garden of Eden be your holy books, and your orchard the Arabs’ books.” Pearce wrote of Ibn Tibbon that,

[f]or his new, non-Arabophone audience, he could not simply quote Dunash but instead had to adapt the epigram in order to speak simultaneously to two audiences: first to the Andalusi audience that would recognize the source of the quotation, and second to the Provençal readers who could read his adaptation without finding themselves alienated by books they could not, and perhaps did not wish to, read.

It is our hope that this book review section will become both a companion to our learning and growth but also a catalyst and maybe even a challenge, helping us to enrich and expand our knowledge and understanding of Jewish learning, texts, and history.

Rabbi Michael Pitkowsky, Ph.D,, is Manager of Enrollment Analytics at St. Francis College and book review editor for this journal.

Categories
Vol. 67, No. 1 (Winter 2022-23)

“Teología profunda” y crítica bíblica según Abraham J. Heschel implicancias educativas (pdf)

Download PDF

Download PDF

Categories
Vol. 67, No. 1 (Winter 2022-23)

“Teología profunda” y crítica bíblica según Abraham J. Heschel implicancias educativas

A menudo se argumenta que la obra de Heschel corresponde al ámbito de la poesía y la lírica y no al ámbito del pensamiento filosófico sistemático. En mi opinión, pueden hallarse al menos dos posibilidades para escapar de esta ‘acusación’: La primera posibilidad es leer los tres volúmenes de Heschel, ‘La Torá celestial en el espectro de las generaciones’¨como una especie de Mishná, es decir, como el texto canónico que construye un método sistemático y antes de confundirnos en el mar de citas, ayudarnos con otra de sus obras, por ejemplo ‘Dios en busca del hombre’ que puede servirnos como una Guemará,1 es decir la explicación al primer texto. La segunda opción, quizás más sencilla, es centrarnos en un concepto clave de la totalidad de su pensamiento y a través de él, intentar buscar una llave de sistematización. Creo que existe un concepto en Heschel que nos permite realizar una tarea de este tipo, por lo que elegiré la segunda opción para llegar a los temas de mi interés a través de los siguientes ejemplos: la revelación divina, la crítica bíblica y sus implicancias educativas tal como se reflejan en el pensamiento de Heschel. 

En un artículo publicado en 1960, Heschel acuñó el término ‘Teología profunda’.2 Este concepto nos es necesario, según Heschel, para distinguirlo del término tradicional ‘Teología’. La ‘Teología’, expresa los postulados y las instituciones positivas de la religión, como, por ejemplo, la realidad de la existencia divina, los códigos de conducta religiosos e inclusive las formulaciones ‘oficiales, del modo de la revelación divina, del tipo “Moisés recibió la Torá en Sinaí de manos de Dios¨. La ‘Teología’ pertenece al ámbito de la racionalidad, ámbito que puede expresarse en formulaciones humanas, lógicas y a veces frías y distantes. Frente a la ‘Teología’ encontramos a la ‘Teología profunda’, que no es precisamente racional y no se le puede dar expresión verbal humana. La ‘Teología profunda’ pertenece a la dimensión de ‘lo que no se puede expresar’, lo Inefable; También es preconceptual y se absorbe a través de la experiencia humana no mediada.

La ‘Teología’ pertenece al estrato del simbolismo religioso, mientras que la ‘Teología profunda’ pertenece al ámbito del presimbolismo religioso.3

De hecho, ‘Teología’ y ‘Teología profunda’’ se complementan. La ‘Teología’ sirve en nuestras vidas como una oportunidad de oro que nos permite entrar en el terreno de la ‘Teología profunda’. Se puede decir que todo concepto del espectro de la ‘Teología’ tiene un valor paralelo en el ámbito de la ‘Teología profunda’. Dentro de la ‘Teología profunda’ están las cuestiones religiosas cuyas postulados encontramos en el estrato racional de la ‘Teología’. La Teología’ simple, desprovista de la “Teología profunda”, produce desviación y falta de sentido. La ‘Teología profunda’ sin ‘Teología’ crea una espiritualidad que carece de la capacidad de ser puesta en práctica en la vida religiosa. Sólo la combinación correcta de ambas expresará todo el potencial de la vida religiosa. Las instituciones religiosas son una especie de fotografías inmutables sobre experiencias inefables, reflejo de un eco de la eternidad. Si no existieran instituciones religiosas, los seres humanos inevitablemente perderían estas vivencias, dado que las experiencias sobre lo inefable son raras y difíciles de lograr, por eso las instituciones religiosas nos resultan imprescindibles, en tanto que están ligadas a las dimensiones de tiempo y espacio. La ‘Teología’ es uno de los modos de comunicación importantes en que el alma dialoga con la razón. Esta comunicación traspasa estas inusuales perspectivas a la vida diaria.

Tomemos por ejemplo el sistema halájico. La observancia formal de preceptos, puede dejarnos en el nivel ‘teológico’ y puede conducir a una desviación religiosa. La Halajá puede introducir a sus practicantes en la ‘Teología profunda’ sólo si va acompañada de una Agadá, una narrativa. La observancia de una mitzvá (precepto) será digna de ser definida como una actividad religiosa sólo si va acompañada de intención y significado (kavaná). Aparentemente este análisis de Heschel es una crítica al enfoque formalista de la observancia de los preceptos. Sin embargo, debemos también, enfatizar la situación opuesta. Al comienzo del capítulo número 29 del libro ‘Dios en busca del hombre’, cuyo título es ¿Solo por la fé? - Heschel critica la concepción moderna del concepto de religión, según la cual la religión es un asunto relacionado con la emoción humana y los estados mentales. Leemos ahí:

“A muchos de nosotros nos resulta difícil de entender el principio sustentado por el judaísmo según el cual la religión y la ley son inseparables. La dificultad acaso se explique por la concepción que acerca de la esencia de la religión tiene el hombre moderno.”4

Ejemplificaré la relación entre ‘Teología’ y ‘Teología profunda’ a través del tema de la crítica de la Biblia y la Revelación. El postulado de la ‘Teología’ según el cual Moisés recibió la Torá de Dios tiene su paralelo en la ‘Teología profunda’: El primero es tema de investigación de la ciencia de la historia, que aborda la expresión literaria humana, mientras que el otro es el tema central de discusión de la filosofía de la religión, y comienza con el encuentro directo entre el primer hombre y Dios. Sólo la filosofía de la religión debate propiamente el acontecimiento de la Revelación. Acerca del rol de Moisés en la redacción de la Torá escribe Heschel:

El principio de la redacción de la Torá a manos de Moisés se basa en dos suposiciones: Según la primera suposición Moisés era profeta, es decir, recibió inspiración divina y era el sujeto de tal inspiración. Según la segunda suposición, Moisés redactó la Torá. El primer supuesto implica un misterio que no podemos imaginar ni definir; El segundo supuesto indica un acto que puede describirse en las categorías de tiempo y espacio. La teología enfatiza la segunda suposición, mientras que la ‘Teología profunda’ enfatiza la primera.5

No hay duda de que el concepto de revelación es central en el pensamiento de Heschel. El término aparece a lo largo de sus escritos, a veces directamente, como en el análisis fenomenológico de la profecía en su tesis doctoral sobre los profetas,6 en “Dios en busca del hombre e indirectamente en casi todos los demás escritos. En su libro sobre Heschel, Alexander Even Chen señaló correctamente que en el concepto de revelación hay elementos trascendentes e inmanentes:

Por un lado, Heschel describirá a Dios como inefable y señalará su carácter trascendente. Por otro lado, desarrollará una teoría de la cognición, basada en conceptos del método fenomenológico por el cual el hombre es capaz de revelar y escuchar la voz de Dios en las capas más profundas de su conciencia. El Dios de Heschel está presente y el hombre debe revelar esta presencia.7

La revelación tiene un aspecto existencial que se expresa metafóricamente en el encuentro entre el Cielo y la Tierra, pero -como afirma Even Chen- este encuentro no se produce entre dos partes equivalentes, al estilo Buber. El encuentro en cuestión tiene connotaciones místicas: Dios se esfuerza por concretar su divinidad en el universo a través del hombre, y el hombre responde a esta necesidad de Dios de revelarse a través del descubrimiento de la capa del misterio de la vida. El estatus humano no equivale al estatus divino, pero su participación en la revelación es esencial y, sin ella, no tiene lugar. El lenguaje humano es incapaz de describir la revelación. Tal experiencia llevará a la persona a distorsionar la fenomenología del evento. Por eso Heschel siempre prefiere un texto lírico que describa el encuentro entre el cielo y la tierra a un texto en prosa. Además, Heschel cree que cuanto más poético sea el texto, más fielmente refleja la fuente de la revelación.

¿Cuál es el papel de la crítica bíblica dentro del mundo del pensamiento de Heschel? La crítica bíblica opera en el campo ‘teológico’, racional y conceptual. Como se ha dicho, Heschel no propone una comprensión antirracional de la revelación, sino una comprensión meta racional.8 El análisis filológico-textual puede ayudar a una persona a entrar en el ámbito de lo que no es dable de decir, lo inefable, en otras palabras, la ‘Teología profunda’. Sin embargo, el error básico de quienes se ocupan de la crítica bíblica es la creencia de que la crítica ya está en el ámbito de la ‘Teología profunda’. Los críticos bíblicos se creen capaces de tratar en términos analíticos lo que no se puede expresar. En mi opinión una de las implicancias de lo dicho hasta aquí es que según Heschel la crítica textual “baja”, la que se ocupa sólo de cuestiones filológicas y no del origen del texto, nos es necesaria con moderación y a condición de que sea consciente de su papel, en tanto que la crítica “alta” del texto, la que se ocupa de su origen, autor/es, etc., lleva a los críticos a la autocontradicción, pues trata de expresar con palabras lo que por su esencia no se puede expresar. 

Los críticos del método de la crítica alta se equivocan en su mayoría cuando niegan la dimensión revelada de la Torá basándose en la multiplicidad de fuentes textuales. Hemos aprendido que, según Heschel, debemos luchar en dos frentes simultáneamente: contra el fundamentalismo y contra el racionalismo:

En nuestro encuentro con la Biblia podemos adoptar una posición fundamentalista, que considera cada palabra como literalmente válida sin hacer distingos entre lo eterno y lo temporal y sin dejar margen para una comprensión personal o histórica, o para la voz de la conciencia. O bien podemos adoptar una posición racionalista, que tomando a la ciencia como piedra de toque de la religión considera a la Escritura un producto o mito poético útil para los hombres de una civilización inferior y por ende obsoleto en cualquier período posterior de la historia.

La filosofía de la religión debe liberar una batalla en dos frentes, tratando de aventar las falsas ideas de los fundamentalistas y de amortiguar la excesiva confianza de los racionalistas. El objetivo último de es conducirnos hacia un plano más alto de conocimiento y experiencia, hacia el apego mediante la comprensión.9

Por un lado, es la crítica baja es la que puede ayudarnos a combatir el fundamentalismo e incluso abrir la puerta a la ‘Teología profunda’ de la Biblia y el concepto de revelación. La crítica baja apunta al aspecto humano de la revelación que es vital, inevitable e imperfecto. Por otro lado, la crítica alta puede distorsionar el estado revelador de la Biblia. Refiriéndose al papel de Moisés como autor de la Torá, Heschel escribió:

Reducir el problema de la revelación a una cuestión de cronología es un grave malentendido. Así se da por sentado que la autoridad y la santidad del Pentateuco dependen del hecho de que fuera escrito en su totalidad en tiempos de Moises, y suponer que aunque sólo sea unos pocos pasajes fueron agregados tras la muerte de Moisés es negar el principio de la revelación.10

Y en el pasaje más famoso sobre lo que sucedió en el Monte Sinaí, Heschel escribe:

No debemos tratar de leer los capítulos de la Biblia relativos al suceso del Sinaí como si se tratara de textos de teología sistemática. La intención de estos capítulos es celebrar el misterio, ponernos en contacto con él, antes que penetrarlo o explicarlo. Como crónica de la revelación, la Biblia misma es un Midrash.11

La participación humana en el encuentro revelador convierte a la Biblia en el producto de una acción de traducción de la experiencia de “lo que no se puede decir”. La Biblia permite a sus lectores testificar ‘en el lenguaje de los hombres’ sobre la experiencia profética y es la principal herramienta a nuestra disposición que nos permite ser copartícipes de esta experiencia. Podemos notar aquí un punto en común entre el status bíblico y la doctrina de la Revelación a la que se refiere Franz Rosenzweig. Sin embargo, hay una diferencia fundamental entre los dos. Para Rosenzweig, la Biblia es fruto de la revelación del editor, denominado por nosotros Moisés nuestro maestro, y por lo tanto la crítica bíblica no perjudica el estatus de la revelación existencial. Para Heschel, la propia definición de la revelación como perteneciente al campo de la ‘Teología profunda’ no deja lugar a la crítica alta. En principio, en la definición de revelación en términos filosóficos modernos, espiritualistas, existe el potencial de promover el aprendizaje crítico ya que la problemática se traslada del concepto histórico de la revelación, que depende de tiempo y espacio y, por lo tanto, sujeto a refutación científica, a un concepto supra histórico, que no puede ser refutado. Sin embargo, la definición de revelación de Heschel, que también pertenece al ámbito espiritualista, no se ajusta al proceso descrito porque se percibe precisamente como una aguda contradicción y como un intento de expresar aquello que no se puede expresar.

Implicaciones educativas

Una de las principales afirmaciones que aparecen en todos los escritos de Heschel tiene que ver con la crítica hacia la modernidad. La sociedad actual ha creado muchas barreras entre la naturaleza humana y su estado de alineación. La tecnología y el exceso de racionalidad han hecho olvidar al hombre las cuestiones vitales de su vida, a través de las cuales sólo es capaz de redescubrir su verdadera naturaleza. Dios siempre se vuelve hacia el hombre, pero el hombre de hoy es ciego e incapaz de percibir el llamado de Dios. La conexión entre el ‘daño’ provocado por el racionalismo extremo y la determinación ontológica que describe un giro constante de Dios hacia el hombre, nos lleva a una concepción filosófica revolucionaria. De acuerdo con la filosofía ‘tradicional’, es trabajo de la persona hacer las preguntas correctas y tratar de responderlas. Según Heschel, el hombre no pregunta, sino que se le pregunta, siempre.

La interpelación divina es esencialmente la necesidad de la creación de la aptitud del hombre para captar las cuestiones últimas sobre la vida. La respuesta a la interpelación crea la dimensión reveladora. Aún cuando las respuestas a las preguntas últimas están, como se dijo, sólo en el reino del misterio y como tales son respuestas que se ajustan a él.12 El campo del misterio, el estudio de la Torá y la observancia de sus mandamientos tienen resultados multidimensionales. Por un lado, el encuentro personal entre el judío y su Dios tiene lugar en la misma dimensión. Por otro lado, este encuentro es una confirmación de la autenticidad de la revelación tradicional.

¿Cuál es la teoría educativa a la que nos induce este pensamiento judío-religioso? Para que el hombre descubra las preguntas últimas sobre su existencia, debemos educarlo a que sienta lo maravilloso en el orden de la vida.13 La herencia cultural-religiosa a la que pertenece nos ayudará a realizar la tarea.14 Heschel define así el papel de la educación judía:

Nuestras escuelas deben hacer lo que las escuelas seculares no han logrado. Deben transmitir a los alumnos el sentido de milagro y misterio de estar vivos, el sentido de nuestro significado, la conciencia de la santidad del tiempo. Debemos dedicarnos en la educación al problema fundamental de nuestra existencia - cómo iluminar nuestro caos interior.15

En numerosos sitios, Heschel usa la metáfora de las mitzvot como “andamios” que nos permiten sentir la maravilla de la vida abriendo las puertas de la fría capa de la racionalidad y entrando en un mundo religioso-vivencial que no se puede describir de modo racional, sólo poético. Como se mencionó, las enseñanzas educativas de Heschel combinan con mucho éxito elementos trascendentales e inmanentes. El hombre está obligado a buscar siempre aquello que está más allá de su vista diaria. Es más, la vida rutinaria y ‘simple’ son los obstáculos que se interponen en el camino del hombre hacia la trascendencia. Mientras que en la experiencia religiosa trascendental la actividad humana inmanente tiene un papel vital. Heschel no aboga por una experiencia mística en la que el hombre se pierde en el infinito divino. Además, según Heschel, Dios busca al hombre para que se realice y comprometa dentro de este mundo y por lo tanto no hay sustituto para el rol del hombre en el evento de la revelación. El propósito del educador según Heschel es paradójico. La experiencia de la maravilla de la vida nos conducirá a un tipo especial de conocimiento: el conocimiento de que es imposible saber, en el sentido racional, las respuestas últimas sobre la vida, sino solo experimentarlas. En este asunto la Biblia tiene un papel de primer orden. La virtud importante del texto bíblico es que tiene el poder de activar en el lector una acción profética. En otras palabras, la Biblia es un Midrash sobre la revelación y explica en terminología humana lo que no se puede expresar. Esta virtud del texto bíblico hace que sus lectores salgan del mundo ordinario y ‘simple’ y entren en el mundo del misterio. De ser así, la Biblia es la principal herramienta pedagógica de un educador. Como hemos visto, Heschel ve la crítica alta de la Biblia como un acto educativo que puede estropear al lector.

La crítica discute el nivel racional - el que trata de dar una respuesta a cada pregunta y busca las razones científicas de los acontecimientos. Mientras que, según la concepción de Heschel, el propósito supremo de la Biblia es hacer que una persona encuentre las preguntas correctas sobre su vida y permitirle una entrada experimental en el reino del misterio. Según Heschel, el estudio crítico no contradice la creencia por sus conclusiones sino principalmente por su metodología, que convierte lo secundario en lo principal. Heschel cree que la Biblia es un documento humano-divino sobre la revelación, que provoca que nos maravillemos por la vida. Este maravillarnos crea una situación de revelación, siempre y cuando la metodología que dicte el camino sea la correcta. Los maestros de Biblia, por lo tanto, deben emocionar, deben motivar a los estudiantes a experimentar vivencias religiosas a través del texto. El perfil de dicho maestro deberá basarse en el carisma más que en el excelente dominio de la materia, en su sensibilidad y profundidad vivencial y no necesariamente en la capacidad analítica.

Allí estará el modelo que presentará al estudiante la percepción de que quien no ha experimentado la experiencia de la maravilla de la vida no merece ser llamado ser humano, ya que este tipo de privación indica una carencia fundamental en la esencia del hombre.

En este sentido, el papel de los profesores es hacer más hincapié en ser “hombres de texto” (text men) en comparación con el énfasis convencional en libros de texto. Heschel define la tarea educativa de un profesor de este tipo como ‘un texto que los alumnos jamás olvidarán’.16

En un artículo importante sobre la concepción de las mitzvot de Heschel, Arnold Eisen argumenta que Heschel pudo transmitir con éxito la profundidad de la vida en las mitzvot, pero no logró establecer una fuente sólida de autoridad para ellas. La solución a este problema, según Eisen, era que el mismo Heschel se convirtiera en una “hombre de texto”, una figura pública que sería un modelo a imitar.17

El maestro que enseñe según el método de Heschel se asegurará de resaltar los temas bíblicos que no pueden ser entendidos racionalmente por un lado, y revelará a sus alumnos un mundo de pensamiento-experiencia profundo en esos textos, profundidades que evocarán una sensación de asombro por otro lado. No olvidemos que la lucha contra el fundamentalismo se lleva a cabo a través del estudio textual-filológico moderado. El profesor ‘vivencial’ también debe ser capaz de tener una comprensión profunda del texto y las reglas de sintaxis y gramática. Está claro que esta habilidad, si lleva al estudiante a una mejor comprensión analítica del texto, no le agregará ninguna ventaja real. La capacidad de la comprensión filológica para proporcionar al alumno una descripción más fidedigna del testimonio sobre la revelación que representa el texto tiene que tener como objetivo optimizar su entrada en su estrato vivencial.

El sistema normativo también sirve como una herramienta importante para lograr este objetivo. La ley (halajá), va acompañada de narrativa (agadá), lo permanente, va acompañado de innovación. En el proceso creativo, estos son los “andamios” que construyen un mundo de sensibilidad al asombro frente a la existencia.

Se puede afirmar que la educación según Heschel es hasta cierto punto lo contrario de la educación socrática. Sócrates trató de despertar el asombro en sus alumnos como punto de partida para hacer las preguntas importantes y dar las respuestas correspondientes. Para Heschel, quien sostiene que no existen respuestas racionales a las preguntas últimas sobre la vida, el asombro no es el punto de partida sino el punto final del proceso educativo. Es básicamente una educación en una escuela de profetas o una educación profética según la definición fenomenológica de Heschel. El profeta es “El ser humano” por excelencia, es el que es capaz de sentir lo maravilloso de la vida, el que puede descubrir que las preguntas que le hacen son las últimas y profundas y tiene la posibilidad de responder correctamente, según la voluntad de su Creador. El Pathos profético sirve como factor contagioso en sus oyentes y sucesores; es un modelo para la educación general.

Me gustaría hacer un comentario sociológico sobre la doctrina de Heschel. Durante varias décadas, sus escritos han sido una fuente de inspiración espiritual para los defensores del judaísmo liberal en todo el continente americano. Este fenómeno es muy importante, aunque en mi opinión el enfoque es defectuoso en varios aspectos. Sin duda, uno puede encontrar en Heschel, un poder espiritual de primera magnitud que desafía cualquier estado de cosas. Se supone que el pensamiento de Heschel causa incomodidad a aquéllos cuya principal experiencia en la vida es la comodidad. Sin embargo, creo que la mayoría de la audiencia que fue educada a la luz de Heschel a través de sermones de rabinos que citaban sus libros en todo momento, la mayoría de esta audiencia no logró llegar a un compromiso práctico con la tradición judía normativa. El uso de Heschel entre el judaísmo liberal a menudo se hace para brindar a los usuarios experiencias estéticas (debido a la belleza de su poesía) y tranquilidad más que para plantear un desafío intelectual que lleve a la acción.18 Si, para Heschel, la Halajá sin Hagadá es un legalismo vacío, entonces el público liberal tiende a enfatizar, lahagadá sin halajá. Como hemos mencionado, para Heschel no existe la posibilidad de la existencia de la ‘Teología profunda’ por sí sola ya que esta debe expresarse a través de una de las instituciones de la ‘Teología’; o mejor dicho: la única manera de entrar en el terreno de la ‘Teología profunda’ es a través del ‘andamiaje’ que la tradición nos ha dado de antemano. Según Heschel, el texto bíblico es una de las principales herramientas para lograr este objetivo, sin embargo, la más importante es la observancia de las mitzvot, los preceptos. Heschel argumenta que cumplir las mitzvot de modo intelectual es sin duda inútil, pero una vida espiritual conectada con el reino del misterio sin el cumplimiento de las mitzvot es imposible, ya que como se afirma, la mitzvá es la confirmación de la autenticidad de la revelación tradicional. La mitzvá es tanto una expresión de la voluntad divina como su interpretación.19

“Ídolos en el templo” es uno de los artículos importantes de Heschel, en el que trata el tema de la educación religiosa. En este artículo, Heschel repite algunos de los temas clave de sus escritos, como la educación hacia las cuestiones esenciales de la vida, una crítica del estatus de la religión en la sociedad moderna y más.

En este artículo, sin embargo, incluso se opone explícitamente al uso de la religión para necesidades espirituales separadas de la observancia de las mitzvot. Para él, tal uso de la religión sería más un entretenimiento que otra cosa.20 La educación religiosa debe aspirar a la ‘educación del carácter’ a través de la ‘siembra del alma humana’ en experiencias de autotrascendencia. A su juicio, el error de las filosofías educativas modernas radica en que han convertido las necesidades en objetivos educativos. Según Heschel, éste es el comienzo de la idolatría: convertir las necesidades de un objeto en adoración. En este momento la revolución copernicana es una necesidad existencial: los fines últimos de la vida deben convertirse en necesidades. El mismo Heschel da un ejemplo de una meta que sirve como necesidad:

Las metas últimas, como las ve nuestra tradición, no son valores supratemporales; no son entidades metafísicas y absolutas. Los objetivos finales son mandamientos.21

Sin duda la principal corriente que surge de las implicaciones educativas en el pensamiento de Heschel está relacionada con la ‘educación del carácter’ o ‘educación del carácter profético del hombre’, aquélla que es capaz de descubrir cuáles son las preguntas últimas que se le plantean en la vida. Pero como ya sabemos, Heschel argumenta que es imposible permanecer en la dimensión espiritual desligada de la vida práctica, que se traduce según la tradición en Torá y mitzvot.

Y en cuanto a nuestro tema: el status de la Biblia y su estudio científico lo podemos comparar con uno de los pasajes de Heschel que aparece en su libro ‘¿Quién es el hombre?’22 Al principio, Heschel explica el contenido del libro diciendo que tratará de ¿Quién es el hombre? y no de ¿Qué es el hombre? Hay que decir que, en el tema de la Biblia, Heschel argumentaría que quienquiera que se acerque a su estudio para satisfacer sus necesidades intelectuales, para descubrir racionalmente lo que es, se aparta del objetivo central.

Heschel argumenta que la Biblia es la puerta a la ‘Teología profunda’, por lo que la pregunta que responde la Biblia es ‘¿cuál es ese tipo de teología?’. La Biblia es expresión de misterio, de una dimensión relacionada con nuestra esencia como seres humanos. Como tal, la Biblia está abierta al público en general y no es el dominio exclusivo de una élite intelectual.

Sin duda, Heschel se dirige a un público religioso-liberal. Esto se puede sentir en el tono de sus palabras en la mayoría de sus escritos, cuyo objetivo principal es ‘traer bajo las alas de la Divinidad’ a los alejados de la práctica judía. Sin embargo, y en vista de lo dicho sobre la dimensión normativa en el pensamiento de Heschel, creo que incluso un público nacido naturalmente en una situación normativa podrá aceptar el enfoque de la ‘educación para el asombro’.23

El énfasis vivencial, o la ‘escuela de profecía’, no sólo no perjudicará a este público, sino que gran parte de él podrá incluso beneficiarse de esta manera porque así se ofrecerán diversas soluciones a los problemas que aquejan a la sociedad actual. Si el uso correcto del pensamiento de Heschel puede contribuir a la entrada del público liberal distante de la halajá en el mundo normativo del judaísmo, entonces ese mismo uso puede dar al público normativo la oportunidad de ejercer una crítica profunda de la visión legalista que adopta la experiencia desprovista de la vivencia y del asombro.

El Rabino Dr. Ari Bursztein es el Decano Académico del Seminario Rabinico Latinoamericano.


1 Heschel Abraham J., Heavenly Torah-As Refracted trough the Generations, ed. and translated by Gordon Tucker, Continuum, New York-London, 2005, últimamente salio una nueva edicion de la obra original en hebreo corregida según nuevos manuscritos encontrados. Ver Torá min hashamaim beaspaklaria shel dorot, ed. Dror Bondi, Maggid, Israel, 2021. Ibid, Dios en busca del hombre, ed. Seminario rabínico Latinoamericano, 1984 (adelante Dios en busca del hombre). Para un análisis de la relación entre las dos obras ver, Arnold Eisen, “Re-Reading Heschel on the Commandments,” Modern Judaism 9 (February 1989), pp. 2-3.

2 Se publicó por primera vez en Heschel, Abraham J., Cross Currents, (n.p.) 1960. Luego en Ibid, The Insecurity of Freedom, New Cork 1966, pp. 115-126. (adelante The Insecurity).

3 Ibid., p. 115. Es interesante comparar el “simbolismo religioso” con el pre-simbolismo religioso” con la conocida exégesis sobre los dos primeros capítulos del Génesis del Rab. Yosef Dov Soloveitchik. Otro de los paralelismos entre Heschel y Soloveitchik, según esta exégesis sobre Heschel a través de los conceptos ‘Teología’ y ‘Teología profunda’, es la consecuencia ‘dicotómica dualista’ sobre la cual se entienden las dos filosofías. A mi parecer, hay cierto peligro de superficialidad al plantear un pensamiento en forma dicotómica, cuestión que será tratada en otro lugar. De todas maneras, es interesante prestar atención al ‘objetivo final’ de esta dicotomía en los dos pensadores. Para Soloveitchik la tensión dicotómica es una situación de tensión existencial, con la cual el hombre debe convivir permanentemente. Según Heschel la dicotomía, por ejemplo, entre los conceptos pertenecientes a la ‘Teología’ y a la ‘Teología profunda’ son extremos que funcionan sólo con un objetivo de armonización.

4 Dios en busca del hombre, pág. 375. Eugene Borowitz se equivoca cuando le adjudica a Heschel una intención de preferencia de la narrativa ante la ley. Ver Eugene Borowitz, “A New Jewish Theology in the Making,” Conservative Judaism 10 (Winter 1956), p. 160.

5 The Insecurity, p. 118.

6 Abraham Joshua Heschel, Los Profetas, ed. Paidos, 3 vol. Buenos Aires, 1973.

7 Alexander Even Ch en, Kol Min Haarafel (Hebreo-Una voz desde las tinieblas), Tel Aviv, 1999, pág. 11.

8 Un ejemplo de exegesis sobre Heschel que le adjudica una dimensión no racional lo vemos en, Jacob Petuchowsky, “Faith as a Leap of Action” Commentary 25 (May 1958), p. 397.

9 Dios en busca del hombre, pág. 350.

10 Ibid., pág. 329.

11 Ibid., pág. 238-239.

12 Una profundización de este punto se encuentra en, Eliezer Sweid, Hafilosof kenavi hanevuá: haiajas bein filosofia ledat behaguto shel Abraham Joshua Heschel (En Hebreo. El filósofo como profeta de su profecía: la relación entre filosofía y religión en el pensamiento de Abraham Joshua Heschel), Neviim le atzmam vela enoshut (En Hebreo. Profetas para sí mismos y para la humanidad), Jerusalem 1999, pp. 247-248.

13 Sobre el tema "Educación para el asombro" en el pensamiento de Heschel, se escribieron varios trabajos. Entre los mas importantes ver, Alfred McBridge, The Transcendental Themes of Abraham Joshua Heschel and Their Value for Religious Education, Ph.D. dissertation, The Catholic University of America, 1972, Sherry Helene Blumberg, Education for Religious Experience, Ph.D. dissertation, Hebrew Union College, Jewish Institute of Religion, 1991.

14 Es interesante la gran aceptación de Heschel en los círculos no judíos norteamericanos (los trabajos doctorales de la nota anterior son ejemplo de ello). El pensamiento de Heschel fue escrito con terminología judia, pero no es compleja su traducción a cualquier idioma religioso.

15 Abraham Joshua Heschel, “Idols in the Temple,” in The Insecurity of Freedom, pag. 130.

16 Ídem, "La educación judía,” Democracia y otros ensayos, pag. 177. (Originalmente Idem, “The Spirit of Jewish Education, Jewish Education 24, 2 (1953), p. 19. Para un profundizar sobre este artículo de Heschel dedicado a la educación vea Alexander Ibn Chen "Psicología y objetivos educativos en el pensamiento de Abraham Joshua Heschel" (en hebreo), Hagut bejinuj Iehudi 2, 2000, pág., 223-233.

17 Ver Eisen (nota 1), pág. 26.

18 Ver, Ari Bursztein, La reformulación selectiva del pensamiento de A. J. Heschel por Marshall T. Meyer. Su influencia en la judería latinoamericana, Maj’shavot, https://majshavot.org/includes/uploads/articulos/0769e-bursztein.pdf , donde se propone un análisis de la exégesis del gran alumno de Heschel, Marshall T. Meyer, siguiendo las palabras de Daniel Fainstein, según en la educación de Marshall se produjo una Buberización de Heschel.

19 Eisen sostiene que la sintaxis de Heschel es poco clara en este sentido, ya que esta es una expresión de la “Teología profunda” por lo cual no puede haber una sintaxis del todo racional. Ver Eisen (nota 1), pág. 17.

20 Ver Heschel (nota 15), pag. 53.

21 Ibid, pag 63.

22 Abraham Joshua Heschel, ¿Quién es el hombre?, ed. Herder, México, 2019. Mi agradecimiento al Prof. Michael Rosenak por compartir conmigo este pensamiento.

23 Una de las expresiones mas interesantes de este fenómeno es la profundización de las últimas décadas en el Estado de Israel en los escritos de Heschel por parte de público ortodoxo moderno.

Categories
Vol. 67, No. 1 (Winter 2022-23)

Modern Science, Ancient Wisdom, and A New Theory of Hope (PDF version)

Download PDF

<

Download PDF

Categories
Vol. 67, No. 1 (Winter 2022-23)

Modern Science, Ancient Wisdom, and A New Theory of Hope

In these sometimes dystopian times, it is a hopeful sign that we are witnessing the proliferation of books on hope.1 This bounty comes largely from the burgeoning field of positive psychology, often called “the science of happiness and human flourishing.” For most of its history, the study of the human psyche focused primarily on healing or mitigating emotional suffering and mental illness. Positive psychology seeks to balance the important work of traditional psychology with its focus on spreading and increasing happiness, purpose, altruism, hope, and other positive states and traits.

Since the 1990s, positive psychology has added considerably to our understanding of how people “make hope happen.”2 Research and interventions can help Jews and Jewish leaders find hope for themselves, bring it to others, and instill it in our organizations and communities. At the same time, the Jewish tradition offers wisdom on hope that predates positive psychology by millennia.

The latest psychological models focus helpfully on agency, but they neglect to account for a second, vital kind of hope that is spiritually moreso than cognitively and behaviorally sourced. I find this second type of hope in Hebrew etymologies, Jewish texts, and Jewish culture. Based on feedback as well as theory, we need both kinds of hope—the first suggested primarily by positive psychology and the second by religion—to help people imagine and create a brighter future.3

Positive Psychology and Religion

It is no accident that Judaism and positive psychology address many of the same topics.4 With different perspectives and methods, both positive psychology and traditional Judaism seek to shape human attitudes and behavior in order to bring more meaning, joy, goodness, and connection into the lives of individuals and communities.

The Jewish journey begun by Abraham is, in Rashi’s famous interpretation, “for your good/betterment/benefit and for your pleasure/enjoyment.”5 Halakhic, aggadic, and musar literatures have addressed the question of how to pursue “the good life” (in all the senses of that phrase) from antiquity until today. To take just one example, Geoffrey Claussen’s recent book, Modern Musar: Contested Virtues in Jewish Thought, anthologizes the writings of seventy-eight Jewish thinkers on ten virtues.6

Along with commonalities, tensions also exist between positive psychology and religion and even between positive psychology and spirituality. Many positive psychologists reference religious, spiritual, and philosophical contributions to their chosen topics, and some study the well-being of religious people as compared to the general population.7 However, as Sonja Lyubomirsky wrote about the history of the field in The How of Happiness, most researchers remain “hesitant to study spirituality and religion.”8 Positive psychologists rarely engage with or build on religious approaches to subjects like forgiveness, community, joy, intention, purpose, compassion, or hope.

Christopher Peterson and Martin E. P. Seligman wrote Character Strengths and Virtues: A Handbook and Classification to incorporate and in some ways replace the wisdom of world religions on the subject of virtue. They wanted to create an inclusive and even universal schema of positive, admired traits by distilling philosophical and religious writings from across millennia and continents.9 The authors of this ambitious endeavor devoted just eight paragraphs to summarizing Judaism and Christianity.10 Peterson and Seligman reduced all religious contributions to the concept and practice of hope, one of the twenty-four character strengths they identified, to a single, syncretistic sentence: “The term hope has a long history, figuring prominently in Judeo-Christian discourse and naming it one of the chief theological virtues (along with faith and charity).”11

Several authors who have delved deeply into both positive psychology and Judaism have recently begun writing about the intersection between the two.12 This article hopefully (pun intended) contributes to that trend. The fields of religion and positive psychology are just beginning to inform one another in important and powerful ways.

Antipathy to Hope

Like many people during the pandemic, I was discouraged in the spring of 2021. Daily deaths and disruptions continued long past the weeks or months many of us had first imagined—even after vaccines became available. High Holiday planning for 5782 turned out to be more fraught than the year before, when, at least, there was clarity that large groups would not be able to gather indoors.

For months I delved into the topic of hope, including the positive psychology literature. I planned to preach on and for hope during the Holidays and would periodically discuss my reading or writing over dinner with my family. Imagine my surprise when, the day before Rosh Hashanah, my husband said, “I’ve never mentioned this before, but I have an antipathy to the word ‘hope.’ If I hope something will happen, then I fear it won’t.” My response: “Craig, it’s great that we still have some mysteries to discover about one another, but why in the world did you wait so long to tell me this?!”

I quoted this conversation in the opening of my sermon, which, thanks to Craig’s insight, underwent a last-minute rewrite. It is important to begin any discussion of hope, including this article, with the acknowledgment that hope can feel risky, futile, or even false. After trauma or loss, or when the stakes are high or the odds of success slim, we are sometimes afraid to hope. We do not want to “tempt the evil eye” or feel disappointed. People even use the phrase, “I don’t dare hope.” In her famous poem, Emily Dickinson imagines hope as “the thing with feathers.”13 Yes, it perches in the soul and sings amidst the storms. But it can also fly away.

Hope is not only elusive; it becomes anathema, if lazy. The term “false hope” exists because people do not want to trust any version of hope that ignores reality or abdicates responsibility. At our best, we do not want to fool ourselves. Nor do we wish to be deceived by others about facts or challenges.14 We know it will not work to just wish impediments away. True hope takes account of what is, even as it searches for more and better possibilities.15

Nevertheless, I would argue that the world suffers more from too little hope than from unbridled, careless, or even false hope. Rick Snyder, a leader in hope studies, went so far as to question the accuracy of the term “false hope.” As summarized by psychologist David Arnow:

People who scored high on Snyder’s measures of hope were sometimes able to solve so-called impossible laboratory tasks that had not been puzzled out in fifteen years…. Snyder wrote: “Given that society as a whole tends to advance in leaps when ‘impossible’ goals are reached by individuals who dared to try, it seems counterproductive to adopt a policy of automatically dissuading everyone from pursuing seemingly impossible goals…. Care should be taken in concluding that an individual’s goals are ‘pipe dreams.’”16

The Benefits of Hope

It is important to cultivate hope and not just to limit hope hesitancy or mitigate despair. Being hopeful about any topic—including hope itself—motivates action. Both hope and hopelessness tend to become self-fulfilling prophecies. Fortunately, the benefits of hope are enormous and enticing. In fact, “[t]he predictive power of hope in a person’s life is greater than [that of] any other character strength.”17 The following are just some of the benefits verified by peer-reviewed social scientific studies. Knowing and citing these results can help boost hope and its positive effects.

  • Hope increases the likelihood that adults will achieve their goals.18
  • Hope helps people sustain a practice of physical exercise and improve their athletic performance. Higher hope people perform better in sports than their low-hope teammates with equal abilities and similar demographics.19
  • Hopeful students perform significantly better in school, from elementary grades through graduate school, even accounting for various other factors.20
  • Low-hope employees take sick days more than four times as often as their high-hope colleagues, signifying less well-being and productivity.21
  • “Other conditions being equal, hope leads to a 12 percent gain in academic performance, a 14 percent bump in workplace outcomes, and a 10 percent happiness boost for hopeful people.”22
  • Citizens who are hopeful tend to vote.23
  • Hopeful people have better coping skills and more tolerance and resilience to endure physical pain, illness, stress, loss, and natural disasters.24 “In every published study of hope, every single one, hope is the single best predictor of well-being compared to any other measures of trauma recovery.”25
  • People measuring as “high-hope” have better well-being and outcomes, on average, for all forms of cancer, heart disease, diabetes, liver disease, and autoimmune disorders. “When hope is high, patients respond better to treatment, are more likely to engage in prevention strategies, and are more likely to comply with their health providers recommendations.”26
  • Hope reduces depression and anxiety.27 It contributes significantly to recovery from mental illness across various approaches and techniques.28
  • People with high scores on the adult hope scale also score higher on satisfaction, self-esteem, optimism, meaning of life, and happiness.29 “Hope proved to be a strong, unique predictor of…positive emotions.”30
  • Hope assists with psychological adjustment and social-emotional problem solving. “Put simply, hopeful people have better outcomes connected to the way they think and behave.”31
  • People with high levels of hope live longer.32

In one longitudinal study conducted at University of Texas Health Center in San Antonio, researchers demonstrated that “hope is, in fact, a matter of life and death.”33 Among 795 people who were followed over the course of seven years, people who felt hopeless were more than twice as likely than their hopeful counterparts to die of natural causes during the time of the study. This remained true when researchers controlled for various other factors, including ethnicity, sexual identity, drinking, perceived health, medical conditions, age, and socioeconomic status.34 “Twice as likely to die if hopeless” is a devastating statistic. But, in another longitudinal study of 2,428 men, subjects who scored as moderately or highly hopeless were more than three times as likely to die as their peers.35 We say, “keep hope alive,” but it is also true that hope keeps us alive.

To maximize hope’s many benefits without succumbing to delusions or courting crushing disappointment, positive psychology has developed definitions and models for hope.

What is Hope, and Why Do We Need It? Psychological Perspectives

In 1959, when Karl Menninger delivered an address on hope, he wondered whether the subject might be “taboo…. When it comes to hope, our shelves are bare. The journals are silent. The Encyclopaedia Britannica devotes many columns to the topic of love, and many more to faith. But hope, poor little hope! She is not even listed.”36 A decade later, Ezra Stotland published The Psychology of Hope.37 Stotland “understood hope as a joint function of the perceived probability and the perceived importance of attaining particular goals.”38 He considered hope “critical for goal attainment because it is a key component of motivation.”39 Subsequently, Snyder, who has been dubbed the “first ‘hope scientist’” by other positive psychology researchers, likewise emphasized the importance of goals.40 In his view, hope requires and is driven by goals; one must hope for something.

Snyder expressed his definition of hope with this formula: “Hope = Mental Willpower + Waypower for Goals.”41 In other words, hope involves marshaling one’s inner resources, including intrinsic motivation, humor, and strengths (willpower) and employing multiple pathways and strategies for achieving one’s goals (waypower).42 In 1991, Snyder and colleagues introduced the hope scale to create a social science measurement of hope, based on a simple, eight-question survey.43 Four of the eight questions on the hope scale relate to willpower, as Snyder defines it, and four relate to waypower. Willpower dies if one cannot imagine a path or paths to achieving one’s goal. And the mere knowledge of possible paths forward is moot if one lacks the motivation to act. Hope depends on bringing will and way together, in service of a desired end. High-hope thinking is especially valuable when facing obstacles, because “when things get tough…high-hope people channel their energy to an effective alternative pathway.”44 For Snyder, hope has cognitive, emotional, and behavioral elements, with behavior as the main driver. Hope is no mere wish for a good future, nor even a good feeling about how the future can unfold; hope means working for the good future you wish to see. Each successful step creates a virtuous cycle, because seeing and generating options will stoke motivation, and taking consistent action tends to open up new paths of opportunity. Hope becomes the fuel that energizes people to shape a better future.

Snyder argues that the paradigm of willpower and waypower is not a construct he created, but the way in which people already unconsciously think and operate.45 By bringing awareness to our thinking process, we can deliberately kindle hope. To strengthen willpower, Snyder suggests using affirmative language about goals (whether to oneself or in communicating with others), practicing self-care (including healthy eating, sleep, and exercise habits), and focusing on enjoying present-moment engagement with interim steps and objectives rather than fixating on an end goal.46 To boost waypower, Snyder recommends sharpening and prioritizing goals, breaking large goals down into smaller ones, mentally rehearsing next steps, and seeking encouragement and help.

Perhaps surprisingly, Snyder also advocates anticipating obstacles. It may seem more hopeful to expect that everything will go well, but Snyder rejects that sort of optimism as “Pollyanna.” If you can anticipate disruptions and barriers, you may be able to avoid them. In addition, if something unexpected arises that interferes with your goal, you will not tend to feel surprised or defeated. Rather, by imagining likely obstacles, you learn to consider derailments as part of the sometimes circuitous journey toward reaching your goal.47 Positive psychologist Shane Lopez puts it this way: “Hopeful people believe: There are many paths to my goals. None of them is free of obstacles.”48

The last chapter in Snyder’s book is titled “Hope for Relationships and Vice Versa.” Subsequent research has followed his example of examining the power of relationships to buoy hope, including specific connections such as teacher and student, physician and patient, or spouses. Maria Sirois taught that “[h]ope can be seeded from without. How many of us have heard ourselves saying, ‘You gave me hope’?”49 Young people with a history of abuse and trauma do dramatically better in school and in life if they have even one person in their corner who is high in hope, as measured on the adult hope scale.50 Hope and hopelessness are both contagious, including via social media.51

Snyder’s theory and measurement of hope have been hugely influential. Peterson and Seligman include goals and pathways in their updated summary of hope as a value-in-action and character strength.52 In their recent book, Hope Rising, Casey Gwinn and Chan Hellman summarize research using Snyder’s hope scale this way: “with over 2,000 published studies on hope…hope is no longer just a theory, hope is a science.”53

Dan Tomasulo, like virtually all positive psychologists, credits and draws on Snyder’s work.54 He also relies on Barbara Frederickson’s observation—mistaken, in my view—that hope alone among positive emotions “comes into play only when our circumstances are difficult or at least uncertain.”55 In figure 1, Tomasulo details steps necessary for hope that precede choosing a goal, applying willpower, or pursuing waypower. For Tomasulo, hope begins at the bottom of the pyramid with negativity and uncertainty. In a perfect world, there would be no need for hope! Hope is usually activated when something displeases or destabilizes us, whether in the moment or about our future. Awareness of what is uncertain or negative naturally sparks dissatisfaction, worry, or sadness—or even anger, fear, or despair. By climbing up the pyramid, we can choose to move from negative emotions to hope. (Although Tomasulo does not emphasize it, hope sometimes emanates from positive realizations and opportunities as well.56) He writes about the effects on hopefulness of how we relate to difficult circumstances: “When negativity and uncertainty are seen as [insurmountable] obstacles, they keep us stuck and lead to depression. …When [they] are seen as indications of a need to summon our strengths, we change our aspirations or methods.”57 Tal Ben-Shahar similarly defines depression as “sadness without hope.”58

image1.png

Once having identified doubt or negativity, we can marshal resources: first our own (Resources) and then those of others who may be able to help (Support).”59 Tapping into internal and external encouragement is vital to sustaining motivation and to generating new ideas and options.60 At the same time, examining one’s situation and the resources to address it will also lead to realizations about one’s limits. Tomasulo calls this stage “perspective.” What can I control? What can’t I control? This perspective helps people put effort into “controlling the controllables” and making progress, rather than expending energy fruitlessly. As Lopez writes, “re-goaling reclaims willpower from the pursuit of unattainable goals.”61

Some decisions and actions, taken for good reason, end up failing, or at least not producing the expected results. Therefore, recalibration and risk assessment—continual course correction—is the next step up on Tomasulo’s pyramid. Tomasulo, like Snyder, presents a structured process. The very existence of a model with sequenced stages contributes both to hope and to goal attainment. If one is discouraged, there are obvious questions and interventions to pursue: Is it my goal, willpower, or waypower that needs shoring up? Do I need to confront uncertainty? Solicit support? Discern what I can control? Revise my goal?62 “One of the most important ideas consistently confirmed by research is that hope can be learned.”63 Providing a model helps in that learning.

At the top of Tomasulo’s pyramid are goals, continually refined in response to feedback, changing circumstances, and personal growth. Goals are executed by both pathways and willpower, which Tomasulo calls “agency.” Implicit at the apex of the pyramid is that hope does not stem only from negative or doubtful conditions. Hope can build on itself, as other positive and negative emotions also tend to do.64 Hope will open us up to new possibilities, engendering new, exciting goals we might not even have dreamed of before. In addition to responding to current conditions, we can envision opportunities and shape the future by asking “What’s next?” That is the pinnacle of hope.

The Hope of Agency and The Hope of Acceptance

Snyder, Tomasulo, and other positive psychologists use the word “agency” to describe proactive choices. Lopez emphasizes the importance of “Agency Thinking,” or believing that one’s choices will make a difference.65 Activists like Rebecca Solnit, Joanna Macy, Chris Johnstone, Elin Kelsey, and Cleo Wade hold that believing you can make a difference is crucial for motivation and staying power in social justice work.66 Positive psychology directs hope toward specific goals where one’s actions can influence the future and away from areas beyond one’s control. Given that goal revision and course correction are essential elements of the process, even people in dire circumstances can set new goals to meet their “new normal” with hope.67 Exercising agency to affect the future both reflects and promotes hope.

The hope of agency works beautifully in most situations. It also comports with religious notions of free will and repentance. Because human beings can and do make consequential choices, we are responsible and can justly be held to account for our agency. And, for as long as we live, we can choose anew where to direct and how to apply that agency.68 In neurological, psychological, and religious understandings, a major distinction between human beings and other animals is that we can imagine a more positive future and exercise agency to help create it. This is the theme of a book aptly titled by Seligman and his co-authors Homo Prospectus.69

While endorsed by both positive psychology and religion, the hope of agency nevertheless misses a vital form of hope that rabbis and other clergy often witness in action (and notice in its absence). I call it the “hope of acceptance.” Sometimes people do not have control. Sometimes they do not see any path forward. Yet they can still have hope if they place their hope in something larger than themselves.

The hope of agency says, “there is power within me to change things.” The hope of acceptance says, “there may be nothing I (or my circle of influence) can change, but there is a power greater than I, greater than all of us.” Agency acts. Acceptance surrenders. Agency proactively addresses concerns. Acceptance consciously casts its cares.70 Depending on the circumstances, each is wise. Over the course of a lifetime, both are needed.

It is valuable to differentiate, as Tomasulo suggests, between what is within our agency and what is outside it. We can then mindfully direct our activities and deploy our resources. But recognizing the limits to our exercise of free will and to the impact we can have does not necessarily mean limiting or extinguishing hope. Indeed, it has not meant that for billions of people across the globe and over millennia, because they have placed their hope in God. As we shall see, any power that one accepts as greater than oneself can become a source for the hope of acceptance.71

In the conclusion of an interesting and wide-ranging study of hope from a Jewish perspective, Arnow writes that “[a] modern Jewish theology of hope, in my view, rests on two principal ideas: Human beings are created in the divine image. God has put the responsibility for fulfilling our hopes in our hands.”72 This summarizes and Judaizes the hope of agency, while missing the hope of acceptance. Echoing the notions and language of positive psychology, Arnow’s definition of hope relates only to specific goals, as well as to motivations and actions that help achieve them: “Hope reflects our embrace of the possibility of a particular, deeply desired future, and hope fuels our actions to help bring it about.”73

Toward the end of Hope Rising, Gwinn and Hellman write about their Christian faith and the secure “anchor” it provides them. They reference Hebrews 6:19–20 (NIV): “We have this hope as an anchor for the soul, firm and secure.”74 Yet, earlier in the book, they discount the possibility of hope while there is no sense of agency, such as when a loved one dies. “When adversity slams into our lives there is a window of time when we must simply struggle to survive,” they conclude.75 Describing the trauma of house fires, they write:

“It was not yet a time for hope. Hope would come later, after the terror, after the trauma. …They hoped for word that their house was spared. They hoped to find their pets. But this was not really hope. They were wishes. Residents had no power over the outcomes.[…] We call this the survival window, when your focus is not on hope. If someone tries to push toward rising hope in those moments, we will resent them and recoil, as we process the heartbreak, pain, or loss. …However, as we allow the negative emotions to run their course through the survival window, we need proven coping resources like hope to help us navigate back to well-being.

The Talmud invalidates prayers that one’s own house be spared in the case of a fire that has already torn through a neighborhood, although the rabbis’ reasoning is different.76 The Talmud also advises: “Do not comfort [your fellow] while his dead still lies before him.”77 But you do not have to be a rabbi or a psychologist to know that urging people to buck up in the midst of a crisis is both foolish and unkind. For Gwinn and Hellman, hope must be paused during the “survival window.” But, in my experience, this second kind of hope, the hope of acceptance, often operates even amidst trauma and especially when “nothing can be done.” In fact, the hope of acceptance is a solid anchor in turbulent times.

When people have control, they choose hope by taking action. When they lack control, they choose hope by connecting with a power greater than themselves. The first kind of hope, agency, is more focused; the second kind, acceptance, has a wider perspective. It is attached not to specific goals for the future but to timeless, existential, and spiritual yearnings.78 These yearnings may be especially potent in times of crisis. Often during such times, people discover a deeper kind of hope, closer to belief or trust than to goal-setting.

Of course, chaplains and clergy offer encouragement and practical help. But a big part of pastoral work is serving as a reservoir for the hope of acceptance, so that people undergoing the shock of an agency “drought” can be reminded of resources and powers that never run out.79 In a question-and-answer session after one lecture I gave on “Hope in Difficult Times,” a woman shared that she was incapable of setting goals after discovering a recent recurrence of cancer. Hearing about the hope of acceptance, she felt relief. It resonated with her and gave her permission to hope, even when she was overwhelmed by doubt and negativity and did not yet have the capacity to make a plan, take action, or ask for help.

Martin Luther King, Jr. famously said: “On the one hand we must accept the finite disappointment, but in spite of this we must maintain the infinite hope.”80 The context of the quotation is significant. He discussed “the secret of the survival of our slave foreparents,” whose hope continued while their oppressors did everything possible to strip them of agency. “With their bottomless vitality they continually transformed the darkness of frustration into the light of hope. They had the ‘courage to be.’”81 Agency calls on the courage to do; acceptance calls on the courage to be. Alan L. Mittleman commented on the virtue of hope as presented in the Bible: “Hope knows and affirms the value that inheres in being as such.”82 Effective action may be precluded in a given time or circumstance, but being operates eternally. For King, “disappointment” came when arriving at the end of one’s agency, while “infinite hope” lay with God.

People can cling to a power greater than themselves that they do not necessarily identify with God. They might say that their ultimate hope lies in community, family, destiny, truth, goodness, justice, love, karma, the human spirit, or the universe. People both discover and invest their hope of acceptance in such powers.83 The hope of acceptance can come from believing, with Albert Einstein, that “the Ancient One does not play dice [with the universe]”; or, with Rabbi Akiva and other teachers, that “[e]verything that the Compassionate One does, is done for the best” (b. Berakhot 60b); or, with Rev. Dr. King, that “[w]e, as a people, will get to the promised land.”84 A particular goal may or may not be attached. Many Jews consider Jewish peoplehood to be a hope-giving, transcendent power. With or without a professed belief in God, many Jews invest hope in the Torah and its eternal values, ascribing to it greater wisdom and goodness than to themselves, even when they do not understand the text or struggle against it.

The hope of acceptance does not operate only when agency is stalled (due to trauma) or nonexistent (due to circumstances beyond human control). It fosters a partnership. I do what I can by exercising my agency, and I rely on a power greater than my own to do, or at least to own, what I cannot. At the end of The Power of Hope, Rabbi Maurice Lamm puts it this way: “After you have tried, trust. This is the final step, and it is, in many ways, the most important.”85 Rabbi Zalman Schachter-Shalomi advised: “Trust and let The Future pull you.”86

The acceptance that my agency is humble and tiny compared to that of a greater power encourages an appropriate surrender to whatever cannot be changed and a healthy willingness to accept help. To achieve any vision worthy of that name, I must depend on others. Once I exhaust my individual ability to find a path forward, I may be more likely to “borrow hope” from peers and role models, if I have practiced accepting hope from a great power.87 With more allies and support, agency tends to return more quickly.

For those who accept a power greater than themselves, the hope of acceptance operates constantly in the background and can be consciously tapped. The hope of acceptance does not depend on the fluctuations of circumstances or pathways because it relies on the steady presence, strength, and embrace of a great power. It can therefore sustain those who practice it, even when the hope of agency must sometimes pause.

The main Hebrew word for “hope,” tiqvah, reflects the fact that limits on human capacity will sometimes force the hope of agency to stall. Tiqvah comes from the root qoph, vav, he, meaning both “to hope” and “to wait.”88 A second root, yod, ḥet, lamed, has the same double meaning of “hope” and “wait.”89 But this waiting is not a pause to allow “negative emotions to run their course,” as Gwinn and Hellman wrote. The root qoph, vav, he means waiting with joy, courage, and the expectation of a good end despite fear and uncertainty. The term “expectant mother” hints at this kind of waiting and hoping. Things can go wrong during a pregnancy, but parents look forward to the birth, imagining and planning for a hopeful future in vivid detail. Like an expectant parent, the psalmist gains hope and strength from something new and wonderful, already in the making but not entirely by his own power: “Wait on/hope in God (qavveh el YHWH); be strong and of good courage, and wait on/hope in God” (Psalm 27:14).90 “Why so downcast, my soul, why disquieted within me? Have hope in/wait on God (hoḥili leʾlohim); I will yet thank my ever-present salvation, my God” (Psalm 43:5).

In the Bible, hope depends not only on action and agency, but also on waiting and reliance on God. Birthing a better future requires surrender to God’s timing and God’s power. Indeed, one of the names of God is miqveh yisraʾel, the Hope of Israel. Even when God punishes the people and they feel abandoned, Jeremiah calls God “Hope of Israel, its Savior in time of trouble” (miqveh yisraʾel moshiʿo beʿeit tsarah, Jeremiah 14:8). It is Israel who abandons the Hope of Israel, not vice versa. (Jermiah 17:13).

The word miqveh, of course, also refers to a ritual bath. Scholars debate whether the etymology for the two meanings is the same.91 Shachter-Shalomi believed that it is, and that the connection between “hope” and “ritual bath” is the notion of “container.”92 Tiqvah, like the living waters of a miqveh, must be collected and contained.93 Before blessing a congregation, Reb Zalman often advised: “Now strengthen your container to receive.”94 Sometimes, hope seems to leak right out of us. Agency and acceptance can help us to stiffen our resolve and strengthen our hearts (ḥazaq veyaʾameits libbeikh). Within ourselves and as we encourage others, each of us can be a vessel for hope. Miqveh and tiqvah also have in common the invitation to immerse fully—in the healing, purifying waters and in the healing, purifying practice of hope.

Another derivation of the noun tiqvah likewise reflects the higher powers that people connect with and hold onto. The word qav means “line,” and tiqvah can mean “cord” as well as “hope.” In the Book of Joshua, Rahab first lowers the spies who pledge to protect her and her family out her window with a ḥevel, a word meaning “rope” that also connotes destruction and birth pangs (Joshua 2:15). (The spies are in danger, as is Rahab; they are not sure if they can trust her or if they will succeed in their mission.) Then, to designate her home for protection, Rahab lowers a tiqvat hasheni, a blood-red line/cord/hope (Joshua 2:18, 21). Tiqvah is both literally (in the rope) and figuratively (in the hope) a lifeline. For both the spies and Rahab, the lifeline was lowered from on high at a time when agency was nil and destruction imminent.

While the hope of agency works toward particular, cherished ends, the hope of acceptance expresses a more global faith that a good future will unfold. In that sense, the hope of acceptance could also be understood as bitaḥon (“trust”).95 In fact, a well-known phrase in Ecclesiastes 9:4 that uses the word bitaḥon is generally translated in context to mean “hope”: ki mi asher yeḥuvar et kol haḥayyim yeish bitaḥon. The Jewish Publication Society translation is: “For he who is reckoned among the living has something to look forward to.” The King James, Revised Standard, and American Standard Versions read: “For to him that is joined with all the living there is hope.” The Message Bible declares: “Still, anyone selected out for life has hope.”96 Hope resides not in a particular goal, but in life itself.

The balance between agency and action on the one hand and acceptance and expectancy on the other crystallized for me on August 18, 2020, at 1:22 PM. I know the exact moment because of a time stamp on an email from Cooper Breslaw, a student in my synagogue’s Hebrew school. I had asked the children to find or draw a picture representing what hope meant to them. Cooper sent the artwork shown below and added a caption as well.97

“More people helping the elderly” is a vision within our power to achieve. We have the agency to visit elders, honor them, assist them with tasks, and advocate on their behalf. Most of us can open a door and wait patiently. We can all look smilingly into an elder’s face, as the young Mets fan does in Cooper’s personalization of the drawing. Viewing this image stirs the hope of agency. The caption also evokes the hope of acceptance. If we were in denial, Covid-19 reminded us that no one has unfettered agency. Certainly, we can each do our part: follow medical advice, fund research, protect ourselves and our neighbors as best we can. But Cooper was wise enough to understand that no one can know or control when the pandemic will cease to be a threat. There is thus no superhero pictured here overcoming the virus. Instead, Cooper writes about an inner vision of the “pandemic ending.” He has faith that there are benign and healing powers in this universe greater than the virus and greater than any of us. Creation was designed to help repair itself, and Cooper, like all of us, was designed for hope.

What is Hope, and Why Do We Need It? Jewish Perspectives

Hope is a good topic in any Jewish educational setting because it is integral to the Jewish heritage. We have already seen that the Hebrew language suggests ideas about how hope operates. Many scholars believe that Jews brought the concept of hope to the world. Certainly, Jews have needed and embraced hope down the generations. Menninger, along with Jonathan Sacks, Thomas Cahill, and others, distinguished between Greek and Jewish thought with regard to hope. Rabbi Lord Sacks wrote:

At the heart of Judaism is a belief so fundamental to Western civilization that we take it for granted, yet it is anything but self-evident… . It is the belief in human freedom. We are what we choose to be. Society is what we choose to make it. The future is open. There is nothing inevitable in the affairs of humankind.98

By contrast, Sacks added, “[t]he ancients believed that human destiny lay in the stars, or blind fate.”99 In Greek mythology, the gods ruled human destiny, often cruelly and capriciously. In the Bible and the Talmud, God does step into history but for the sake of love and justice. Moreover, Adonai endowed human beings with the power to shape our future, with the awareness that we have that power, as the Torah and Prophets remind us.100

Time may be cyclical in Jewish thought, but it also has a direction and, with the advent of messianic days, a glorious culmination.101 Not only is there reason to hope, the brightest possible future is ultimately a sure bet! Justice will prevail. Love will abide. Peace will reign. In the meantime, we are enjoined against fear, dismay, and despair. Through Moses, God gave that instruction to Joshua and, in turn, to priests, elders, and the entire people (Deuteronomy 31:7–11).102 Isaiah reiterated: “Do not fear, for I am with you. Do not be dismayed, for I am your God” (Isaiah 41:10). Rabbi Naḥman famously taught: “Gevalt, do not despair!”103

Rava names “did you expect salvation?” (tzifita lishuʿah) as one of just a few questions that each person will be asked in heaven (b. Shabbat 31a). Regarding this, Rabbi Eliezer Papo wrote in Pele yoets:

It is not enough to say with one’s mouth that one is anticipating redemption. Rather, it is necessary that a person expect redemption with a whole heart and total belief. Just as a person comes closer to death every day, so, too, does redemption come closer each and every day. If it tarries, then we will wait, for it will come, yes, come, surely, without any doubt…. It is incumbent on every human being to be expectant. The salvation of God can happen in the blink of an eye.104

The energy in this quotation gives one a sense of what a hopeful attitude can contribute. This perspective does not deny obstacles, threats, or difficulties. Death comes closer every day! But even with that stark view of the human condition, and in some ways because of it, tiqvah, bitaḥon, and tsippui (“expectation”) must prevail. We do not have the luxury of despair. Given the limited time each of us has on this earth and the repair we need, both individually and collectively, the tradition offers two possibilities: work to bring redemption and/or wait with great expectation for it. Neither apathy nor resignation are on the menu.

Regarding any goodness that is still wanting in ourselves or in the world, the classic Jewish answer is not “no,” but “not yet.” Eliezer Berkovitz wrote: “Much more than the history of any other people, Jewish history is future-oriented. Its very essence is not the eternal ‘now’ of Rosenzweig, but the everlasting ‘not-yet.’” 105 Repair is our work, and hope is needed to sustain it. Improvement, if not perfection, is possible—and hope is therefore warranted.

Arnow’s recent book, Choosing Hope, demonstrates how hope has been a grand theme and indispensable component in Jewish history, heroes, homeland, texts, prayer, holidays, theology, practices, humor, and survival.106 Sacks wrote in his Future Tense that “[n]ot all, perhaps, but most of the commandments are either about creating hope, individually or through networks of support, or about behaviourally inculcating habits of hope…. To be a Jew is to be an agent of hope.”107

Try talking about the Jewish holidays—even Tisha b’Av, Yom Hazikaron, or Yom Hashoah—and not touching on hope. Hope is vital in the formative narratives of the patriarchs, matriarchs, and exodus—and to the continuity of our people. Hope is a necessary ingredient for teshuvah and tiqqun ʿolam; improvement and repair would not be attempted without it. At joyous lifecycle events, Jewish families extend hope to the entire Jewish people, with the chant siman tov umazal tov yehei lanu ulekhol yisraʾel: “[let this joyous event] be a good sign, omen, and fortune for us and for all Israel.” While traditional mourning practices certainly allow for grief, they also seek to uplift the soul of the departed, spread positive stories and contributions of the deceased, and convey the promise to mourners of better days ahead. It is common for visitors at a house of mourning or attendees at a funeral to say hopefully to one another af simchas, “may we meet at joyous occasions.”

Through the prophet Zechariah, God calls the Israelites “prisoners of hope,” saying, “Return to bitsaron/the fortress, you prisoners of hope, for this very day I announce that I will give back to you double” (shuvu levitsaron asirei hatiqvah gam hayom maggid mishneh ashiv lakh, Zechariah 9:12). The word bitsaron is difficult to translate, but the very clear phrase “prisoners of hope” may be even harder to grasp!108 It seems to be an oxymoron. Prisoners, of all people, might be least likely to hope. When the Israelites were enslaved in Egypt, Moses’s message of hope to them initially fell on deaf ears because their spirits and patience had been stunted by oppressive labor (Exodus 6:8).

For the people of Zechariah’s generation, imprisonment was in the recent past. The destruction of the First Temple and the exile from Judah had been traumatic. After failing to heed Jeremiah’s warnings (Jeremiah 34:1f), the last king of Judah, Zedekiah, was forced to watch his sons killed before he was blinded and led in chains to Babylonian prison for the rest of his life. People starved in the siege of Jerusalem, their houses were burned down, and only the very poor remained there (2 Kings 24–25, Jeremiah 52). The exiles famously “sat down and wept by the waters of Babylon” (Psalm 137:1).

Against this backdrop, Zechariah prophesied to the Jews in exile after the return to Jerusalem became possible, telling them, in effect, “you are bound to hope.”109 The Temple can and will be rebuilt. You may have thought our people were prisoners of the Babylonians, but all along (even before the Persians conquered Jerusalem from them), we were prisoners of hope—and so we remain.

Similarly, Jeremiah bought land in Anathoth, knowing that the conquest of Judah was imminent, to signify hope and confidence that his people would return. He also spoke directly to exiles from the Northern Kingdom, already in Babylon, letting them know that the exile would not be brief, as false prophets contended, yet giving them reason to hope:

For thus says Adonai: when seventy years are fulfilled for Babylonia, I will take account of you out and uphold My good word to return you to this place. For I am know the plans that I made for you, says Adonai, plans for wellbeing and not for harm, to give you a future and hope (’aḥarit vetiqvah) (Jeremiah 29:10–11)

The hope and promise delivered by Jeremiah resonates powerfully today. Jeremiah 29:11 has been Googled more often than any other verse in the Hebrew Bible.110 People literally search for hope on the internet and find it with the “weeping prophet.”

The Hebrew prophets warned of destruction if people did not repent. (In this sense, agency is respected; people are free to choose sin and will reap what they sow.) But the prophets also promised that the nation would survive, and that God would ultimately forgive their betrayal. They preached the hope of acceptance: God and the covenant are powers greater than any sin or conquering empire. “The prophets, even the most pessimistic, were all agents of hope.”111

The Book of Lamentations, attributed to Jeremiah, asserts hope during a crushing period of loss. In vivid, gruesome detail, chapter 3 describes the Jew as afflicted by God’s own hand. His flesh was worn away, and his bones were crushed. He was made to dwell in darkness like those long dead. He was cut off, walled in; pleading, prey; numb; a laughingstock. He was ground into the dust. He thought that his strength and hope were lost (’avad nitsḥi vetoḥalti, Lamentations 3:18). Yet, he rallies:

But this, I call to mind; therefore, I will hope (al kein oḥil). Adonai’s kindness has not ceased, nor has God’s compassion ended. They are renewed every morning. Great is your faithfulness. Adonai is my portion, says my soul, therefore I will hope in/wait on God (oḥil lo). God is good to those who have hope in the Divine (tov YHWH leqav)… It is good to wait/hope patiently and quietly for the salvation of Adonai (tov veyaḥil vedumam litshuʿat YHWH)… Maybe there is hope yet (ulai yeish tiqvah) …. Let us search and examine our ways, and return to Adonai (venashuvah ʿad YHWH) (Lamentations 3:21–40).

The penultimate verse of the entire book echoes the hopeful possibility of repentance, return, and renewal. “Return us to you Adonai, and we shall return. Renew our days as of old.”112 While hope can be found in an imagined, better future, it can also be mined from memory and from the successes of the past. This is the deeper meaning behind of one my favorite Yiddish expressions: oyb siz geshen, siz meglach, “if it happened, it’s possible.” Chronesthesia can be employed to stoke hope.113 Individually and collectively, Jews have survived what seemed at the time to be utterly hopeless situations.114 Facing new challenges, we can draw strength from the acceptance that carried us through previously and find inspiration in the agency that proved effective.

Probably the best-known Hebrew text about hope comes from the prophet Ezekiel, who, like Jeremiah, prophesied during the exile. In his vision of a valley full of dry bones (Ezekiel 37:5–14), Ezekiel is instructed by God to speak to the bones. These bones seem to exercise agency and initiate action; they clatter and rattle, joining together. Yet their hope runs dry. The whole House of Israel is ready to despair: “Our bones are dried up. Our hope is gone (’avdah tiqvateinu). We are doomed.” When they are depleted, the power of God raises them from their graves and carries them to Israel. It was not the winds (ruḥot) blowing from all four directions that resurrected life and hope when all seemed lost. Only the greater power of God’s own breath and spirit (ruḥi) could do that.

Israel’s national anthem, “Hatiqvah” (“the Hope”), was adapted from the poem “Tiqvateinu” (“Our Hope”) written in the late 1870s by Naftali Herz Imber. Inspired by the establishment of the town Petach Tikvah, the anthem reverses the statement made by the House of Israel in Ezekiel, declaring: (ʿod lo’ ’avdah tiqvateinu), “our hope is not yet [or still not] lost.” We sometimes forget how remarkable it is that our ancestors prayed from 70 to 1948 CE for a return to Jewish governance in the Land of Israel, and no generation gave up hope.

In his book on Jewish humor, Joseph Telushkin tells this joke about Jews and hope.

A group of elderly, retired men gathers each morning at a café in Tel Aviv. They drink their coffee and sit for hours discussing the world situation. Given the state of the world, their talks usually are depressing. One day, one of the men startles the others by announcing, “You know what? I am an optimist.” The others are shocked, but then one of them notices something fishy. “Wait a minute! If you’re an optimist, why do you look so worried?” “You think it’s easy to be an optimist?”115

This joke is set in Israel, a modern state whose very existence was based on an improbable dream and vision for the future. It is a nation famous for its grit in the face of opposition and its embrace of forward-thinking social structures and new technology.116 But confidence about the future falters in Israel, too. Every human being wants to hope, and every human being loses the hope of agency at some point. Most of us waver, too, in the hope of acceptance, doubting our connection to or investment in a power greater than ourselves. This is normal; it would be toxic positivity rather than positive psychology to suggest otherwise.117

The old saying, “Jews are just like everybody else, but more so” applies here. Jews have a foundational attachment to hope—and, simultaneously, more reason than most others to lose hope. Hope is endemic to Jewish values and peoplehood, yet tragedy has marked Jewish history and experience. Salo Baron rightly decried the “lachrymose theory of Jewish history.”118 Our story is more than a series of expulsions, inquisitions, crusades, forced conversions, ghettos, blood libels, pogroms, terrorist attacks, and other catastrophes—most notably the Holocaust. Still, that history takes a toll. Gentler forms of oppression can also wear hope down; these include poll taxes, restrictive covenants, school quotas, vandalism, vilification, and employment discrimination.

All this explains another joke in Telushkin’s collection: “What’s a Jewish telegram? It reads, ‘Letter to follow. Start worrying.’”119 One reason Jews have been champions of hope is that we have needed it so much ourselves.

What Hope Does Judaism Offer to Positive Psychology?

Since Jews unfortunately have experienced so much tragedy, we have something to teach the world about enduring difficulty with hope. Over and over, the Jewish people has overcome tragedy and trauma to build a hopeful future despite the odds. The Dalai Lama reached out to Jewish leaders, saying, “tell me your secret… the spiritual secret to Jewish survival in exile.”120 “Jews were and are still called on to be the voice of hope in the conversation of humankind.”121

Along with bearing high levels of trauma and stress, Jews have also experienced extraordinary post-traumatic growth.122 Perhaps the most dramatic example in Jewish history was the establishment of Yavneh and the rabbinic enterprise in response to the destruction of the Second Temple. In our own day, we have witnessed the flourishing of a generation that survived the horrors of the Holocaust. Jews have repeatedly faced existential threats without succumbing to fear, despair, or annihilation. Again, oyb siz geshen, siz meglach, “if it happened, it’s possible.”

Today, climate change, political divides, and mass migration have all reached crisis levels and in many ways are getting worse. Many of us consume fearmongering clickbait and conspiracy theories more than news. The world needs hope. “The capacity to hope has been shown to provide a therapeutic quality that helps refugees overcome seemingly insurmountable challenges… Being hopeful also matters to how we collectively influence what happens on the planet.”123 Jews have given the world the value-concept of tiqvah, the hope of acceptance, and many examples and role models of agency, even during and after catastrophe.

Another important contribution that Judaism makes to the understanding of hope is its emphasis on the collective. The poem and national anthem were never called “Tikvati,” “My Hope.” Our Hope and The Hope are more inclusive, generous, and widely beneficial than any personal hope. Jews generally pray in the plural. The prophets speak to individual kings, but their main audience is the People of Israel. It is our hope that is either found or lost. “These bones are the whole House of Israel.” Jon Levenson writes about Ezekiel’s vision of the dry bones: “Israelite people die, like anyone else; the people Israel survive and revives because of God’s promise, despite the most lethal defeats.124

Isaiah famously promises: “Youths may faint and tire. Young men will surely stumble. But those who hope in/wait on Adonai will renew (yaḥalifu) strength; they will grow new pinions like the eagles; they will run and not tire; they will walk and not faint” (Isaiah 40:30–31). Here, the hopeful are discussed in the plural, with age and gender unspecified. Those who hope in Adonai will have more endurance than the strength of youth or manhood can provide. The Hebrew verb for renewing strength literally means “to change or exchange.” Most translations add a definite article where there is none. The hopeful do not renew/exchange their strength; they renew/exchange strength. Therefore, the verse can be understood to mean that hopeful people rely on one another. The hopeful can even be imagined as running a relay race—each receiving hope, holding it, and passing it on for a collective win. Another interpretation is that believers can exchange their exhaustion for God’s strength.125

There is a danger that positive psychology can devolve into solipsism. Do I engage in gratitude practices primarily because the research indicates that they will make me happier? In that case, people and God, in their goodness, can become mere instruments for me. The sense of obligation and appreciation is diminished, and the focus on what benefits me is strengthened. Hope, in Jewish thought, can be personal, but it is always connected to the collective—the hope for national redemption and universal salvation. Hope will help people achieve personal goals, but it will be wasted if those goals are merely self-serving. A sense of connection and obligation to something greater than oneself is essential to the Jewish relationship with hope but has not yet been integrated into positive psychology models.

What Hope Does Positive Psychology Offer to Judaism?

It would be an oversimplification to say that positive psychology gave us the hope of agency and religion gave us the hope of acceptance. Religions certainly advocate for setting goals, stirring motivation, and generating new paths and possibilities. Likewise, positive psychology encourages the development of a sense of meaning and purpose beyond oneself, even if that larger commitment has not been tied to hope or to a higher power.

The fact that social science can demonstrate the benefits of hope in and of itself provides a vital opportunity to Jewish leaders and communities. Proven benefits stoke the willpower and follow-through needed in order to nurture hope and reach goals.126 Increasing hope will help Jews to sustain social justice work, keiruv (“outreach”), and other challenging, important efforts.

Positive psychologists can help religious leaders better understand and foster connections between hope and other strengths and mindsets. Hope can often lead to awe, and vice versa. Hope is also connected to a sense of purpose. As Lopez writes, “When we choose hope, we define what matters to us most.”127

Positive psychologists have developed an array of tools and interventions to increase hope.128 One of my favorites is an exercise called the “best imagined future or the best possible self.” It requires just fifteen minutes a day of journal writing for three or four days in a row. Sometimes a visualization or gratitude practice is added. In Jewish settings, I have added “spiritual aspirations” to the “relevant areas of life” named in the exercise below, and also asked people to reflect afterward on themes and character strengths that appear in their writing. The effectiveness of this exercise has been studied since 2001. Participants who invest about an hour are generally happier and more hopeful, both during the week of their participation and for months afterward. The simple prompt follows:

Think about your life in the future. Imagine that everything has gone as well as it possibly could. You have worked hard and succeeded at accomplishing all of your life goals. Consider all of the relevant areas of your life, such as your career, relationships, hobbies, spiritual aspirations, and health. Think of this as the realization of all your life dreams. Now write continuously for 15 minutes about what you imagine this best possible future to be.129

Imagine if every rabbi did this exercise and then shared it with students and congregants. Think of the hope and well-being we could spread! Then imagine applying this exercise to institutions and envisioning the best possible future for our synagogues, federations, camps, or schools. This approach would dovetail beautifully with appreciative inquiry methods for strategic planning. Participants would be less likely to succumb to complaining and negativity bias and more likely to draw on strengths in order to meet goals.130

While this and many other positive psychology interventions have proven effective, I recommend beginning a communal conversation about hope with an icebreaker called “head-heart-holy,” invented by Lopez. He would ask people to point to where their hope dominantly comes from—their heads, their hearts, or heavenward, indicating a holy source. Lopez observed:

People don’t hesitate—they each have a working theory of hope based on their experiences. And …they inevitably look around for the people who share their brand of hope…. The truth is, wherever your hands land, you can probably expand your sense of hope…. Feelings of hope may be ephemeral, but they strongly influence our actions. Hope also requires complex cognitive operations that incorporate emotions, not dismiss them. And hope almost always involves a leap of faith, as we move toward a future that even our best efforts can’t guarantee.”131

Scientific assessments are another gift of positive psychology to Judaism. Gwinn and Hellman write: “The truth is that many institutions and organizations don’t want to know whether they are producing rising hope… Churches and synagogues should be increasing hope and, if they are not, benchmarking hope levels can guide vision casting, planning, and programming.”132 People tend to improve in whatever they track. Psychologists have already developed several tools to measure whether hope is rising, and new tools, reflecting Jewish values around hope and targeted to Jewish organizations, can also be invented.133 I can imagine a tiqvah index that incorporates willpower and waypower questions from the adult hope scale and social support questions from the Herth Hope Index, along with questions about the hope of acceptance and hopes for the future of the Jewish people.

Peterson and other psychologists have shown that “hope is especially important in organizations experiencing uncertainty” and is “a more significant predictor of performance in start-up businesses than in more established firms.”134 With historic changes in politics, health, climate, and institutional norms, people and organizations are certainly “experiencing uncertainty,” if not anxiety and crisis. Unpredictability and rapidly changing conditions mean that established Jewish institutions must now, more than ever, cultivate the innovative and hopeful mindset of social entrepreneurship.

Raising Hope

Sacks has a beautiful take on Lekh lekha and uncertainty (Genesis 12:1):“To be a Jew is to be willing to hear the still, small voice of eternity urging us to travel, move, go on ahead, continuing Abraham’s journey toward that unknown destination at the far horizon of hope.”135 Hope means “stepping out to find out.” As we leave the familiar behind, we can lift up our eyes and look for opportunities to find favor and be blessed, as well as to give favor and be a blessing.136 It is not easy to maintain authentic hope, but it is worth it. And it is the Jewish mission.

I recently came across a blog post from Rabbi Rachel Barenblatt, with a bon mot that made me laugh out loud. She observed in a 2021 Rosh Hashanah sermon, “I’m pretty sure no one comes to High Holiday services to hear their rabbi say she’s given up.”137 Keep laughing.138 Keep traveling toward that unknown destination. Keep exchanging strength with your neighbors. Keep setting goals, and keep casting your cares. Keep hope alive, because it will keep you alive, both in body and in spirit.

Debra Orenstein, CIPP, is rabbi of Congregation B’nai Israel in Emerson, New Jersey. She teaches at the Academy for Jewish Religion and across North America as a scholar-in-residence.


1 See sources in subsequent footnotes and the extensive bibliography in David Arnow, Choosing Hope: The Heritage of Judaism (Philadelphia, PA: Jewish Publication Society, 2022). The attendant website, choosinghope.net, offers many valuable resources, including chapter study guides and quotations. I am grateful to Dr. Phoebe Atkinson of the Wholebeing Institute, Rabbi Eric Gurvis of the Musar Institute, and Rabbis Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer, David Bockman, and Gerald Friedman from our weekly ḥavurah for discussing sources with me. Thanks also go to Sylvia and Aviva Orenstein for reviewing my writing, as family members and editors extraordinaire. Translations are mine unless otherwise noted.

2 See the influential Shane L. Lopez, Making Hope Happen: Create the Future You Want for Yourself and Others (New York: Atria, 2013).

3 Feedback came from congregants and students at synagogues in Wisconsin and New Jersey; the Academy of Jewish Religion in Yonkers, New York; and the Positive Psychology Hour co-sponsored by the Marlene Meyerson JCC in Manhattan and the Wholebeing Institute. See Debra Orenstein, “Positive Religion: Hope and Gratitude Through a Jewish Lens,” https://player.vimeo.com/video/6003133819.

4 Guides for practitioners and coaches of positive psychology overlap almost entirely with religious topics; see, e.g., Jonah Paquette, The Happiness Toolbox: 56 Practices to Find Happiness, Purpose and Productivity in Love, Work and Life (Eau Claire, WI: PESI, 2018). Textbooks focus 60% or more on topics that have been central to religion, with 20–40% devoted to topics such as experiments, methods, history of the field.

5 Rashi on Lekh Lekha, Genesis 12:1.

6 Geoffrey Claussen, Modern Musar: Contested Virtues in Jewish Thought, JPS Anthologies of Jewish Thought (Philadelphia, PA: Jewish Publication Society, 2022).

7 The research is summarized here: “Religion’s Relationship to Happiness, Civic Engagement and Health around the World,” Pew Research Center (January 31, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2019/01/31/religions-relationship-to-happiness-civic-engagement-and-health-around-the-world/. See also Sonja Lyubomirsky, The How of Happiness: A New Approach to Getting the Life You Want (New York: Penguin, 2008), 227–39 and 343–48. Rabbi Jonathan Sacks, “Social Capital and Fallen Donkeys,” Jonathan Sacks: The Rabbi Sacks Legacy (5778), https://www.rabbisacks.org/covenant-conversation/ki-teitse/social-capital-fallen-donkeys/ wrote: “Regular attendance at a house of worship turns out to be the best predictor of altruism and empathy: better than education, age, income, gender or race.” In 2015–16, I was privileged to study with Tal Ben-Shahar, Maria Sirois, and Megan McDonough for my certificate in positive psychology. Ben-Shahar, the primary instructor, occasionally and meaningfully drew on Jewish teachings and cultural references in his lectures. Together with his colleagues, he created the acronym SPIRE, designating spiritual, physical, intellectual, relational, and emotional well-being as “five core elements that indirectly lead to happiness”; see Tal Ben-Shahar, Happier, No Matter What: Cultivating Hope, Resilience, and Purpose in Hard Times (New York: Experiment, 2021), Kindle edition, 205 of 2410. Happier No Matter What includes a chapter on each element of SPIRE. The spirituality chapter acknowledges but does not focus on religion. Ben-Shahar describes religion as addressing grand but remote questions, in contrast to spirituality, which addresses people’s everyday lives and sense of purpose. He mentions ancient religious contributions to mindfulness and cites Hillel on caring for both self and other (Kindle edition, 1521 of 2410). Ben-Shahar attributes to Eastern, but not Western, religions the notion that care and empathy for the self are inextricably connected to care and empathy for the other (Kindle edition 1447 out of 2410), notwithstanding the importance and interpretation in Judaism and Christianity of “love your neighbor as yourself” (Leviticus 19:18; y. Nedarim 9:4; b. Shabbat 31a; Sefer haḥinukh #243; and Mark 12:31).

8 Lyubomirsky, How, 228.

9 The VIA (originally Values in Action) Institute supported the research and extolled the book: “From Aristotle and Plato to the major world religions, to other great thinkers and philosophers spanning the last 2,500 years, this work represents the most significant effort in history to review, assemble, research, and classify positive strengths/traits in human beings.” See “Character Strengths and Virtues: A Handbook and Classification,” VIA Institute on Character, https://www.viacharacter.org/character-strengths-and-virtues (emphasis mine). Their schema has been adopted and used by many researchers and practitioners, including Jews attempting to map it onto Jewish values; see, e.g., “Making Mensches: A Periodic Table,” Foundation for Jewish Camp, https://jewishcamp.org/making-mensches/.

10 Christopher Peterson and Martin Seligman, Character Strengths and Virtues (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 48–49. The only sources for virtues they draw on from the Jewish tradition are the Ten Commandments and the book of Proverbs. In coding how different religious traditions relate to attachment, survival, or mastery in relation to hope, Anthony Scioli and Henry B. Biller, Hope in the Age of Anxiety: A Guide to Understanding and Strengthening Our Most Important Virtue (New York: Oxford, 2009), 83 use the Five Books of Moses as their only Jewish source.

11 Peterson and Seligman, Character Strengths and Virtues, 571.

12 Jonathan Sacks, Future Tense: Jews, Judaism, and Israel in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Schocken, 2009), 231–93; Michael J. Harris, David Rynhold, and Tamra Wright, eds., Radical Responsibility: Celebrating the Thought of Chief Rabbi Lord Jonathan Sacks (Victoria, British Columbia: AbeBooks, 2013), esp. 245–58 (“Afterword: A New Musar?” by Tamara Wright); David Pelcovitz and Raphael Pelcovitz, Life in the Balance: Torah Perspectives on Positive Psychology (New York: Mesorah, 2014); Hanna Perlberger, A Year of Sacred Moments: The Soul Seeker’s Guide to Inspired Living (Bloomington, IN: Balboa, 2017); Darren Levine, For a Life of Happiness and Well-Being (Millburn, NJ: Behrman House, 2019); and Arnow, Choosing Hope.

13 Emily Dickinson, “‘Hope’ Is the Thing With Feathers,” Poetry Foundation, https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/42889/hope-is-the-thing-with-feathers-314.

14 The terrible costs of misleading or lying to patients about their prognoses are discussed in Jerome Groopman, The Anatomy of Hope: How People Prevail in the Face of Illness (New York: Random House, 2004), 28–57 (“False Hope, True Hope”).

15 This comports with the definition of spirituality as “coming into relationship with reality” by Carol Ochs, Women and Spirituality (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), 10. Spirituality can transcend this plane of existence, but only if we first come into a profound relationship with what is. Similarly, hope can help overcome current realities and limitations only if we first come into a profound and clear-eyed relationship with what is. See Scioli and Biller, Hope, 13–14 for inspirational language on the distinction between true and false hope.

16 Arnow, Choosing Hope, xvi, summarizing and quoting C. R. Snyder et al., “‘False Hope,’” Journal of Clinical Psychology 58, no. 9 (2002): 1007–8.

17 Casey Gwinn and Chan Hellmann, Hope Rising: How the Science of Hope Can Change Your Life (New York: Morgan James, 2022),19.

18 Joseph Ciarrochi et al., “Hope and Emotional Well-Being: A Six-Year Study to Distinguish Antecedents, Correlates, and Consequences,” Journal of Positive Psychology 10, no. 6 (2015): 1–15, including bibliographical references.

19 Gwinn and Hellman, Hope, 19; Susana C. Marques and Shane J. Lopez, “Promoting Hope in Children,” in The Oxford Handbook of Hope, ed. Matthew W. Gallagher and Shane J. Lopez, Oxford Library of Psychology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 120; and Heather N. Rasmussen et al., “Hope and Physical Health,” in The Oxford Handbook of Hope, 161.

20 Marques and Lopez, “Promoting,” 119–20 and Gwinn and Hellman, Hope, 19–21.

21 Lopez, Making Hope Happen, 52–53. For more on hope and work, see Angela R. Mouton and Monica N. Montijo, “Hope and Work,” in The Oxford Handbook of Hope, ed. Matthew W. Gallagher and Shane J. Lopez, Oxford Library of Psychology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 328 and Gwinn and Hellman, Hope, 20–21, 211–12.

22 Lopez, Making Hope Happen, 50–51.

23 Gwinn and Hellman, Hope, 210. See also “Setting up a Kids Voting Program to Increase Civic Participation: An Effective Practice,” Hope Rising, Lake County, CA, https://www.hoperisinglc.org/promisepractice/index/view?pid=168.

24 Gwinn and Hellman, Hope, 17, 36, 71 and Rasmussen et al, “Hope,” 163.

25 Gwinn and Hellman, Hope, 18 (emphasis original).

26 Gwinn and Hellman, Hope, 15, 22.

27 Groopman, Anatomy; Paul Kwon et al., “The Role of Hope in Preventive Interventions,” Social and Personality Psychology Compass 9, no. 12 (2015): 696–704 and citations there; and Lopez, Making Hope Happen, 56.

28 Gwinn and Hellman, Hope, 25 and Lorie A. Ritschel and Christopher S. Sheppard, “Hope and Depression,” in The Oxford Handbook of Hope, ed. Matthew W. Gallagher and Shane J. Lopez, Oxford Library of Psychology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 209–19.

29 Gwinn and Hellman, Hope, 19. For the Adult Hope Scale, see C. R. Snyder, The Psychology of Hope: You Can Get There From Here (New York: Free Press, 1994), 25, 50–51, 399.

30 Lopez, Making Hope Happen, 56.

31 Gwinn and Hellman, Hope, 18. This is what Tomasulo calls “recalibration” in the chart and discussion below.

32 Amber M. Gum, “Promoting Hope in Older Adults,” in The Oxford Handbook of Hope, ed. Matthew W. Gallagher and Shane J. Lopez, Oxford Library of Psychology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 145 and Lopez, Making Hope Happen, 59–62.

33 Lopez, Making Hope Happen, 59.

34 Stephen L. Stern, Rahul Dhanda, and Helen P. Hazuda, “Hopelessness Predicts Mortality in Older Mexican and European Americans,” Psychosomatic Medicine 63 (May 2001): 344–51.

35 Susan A. Everson et al., “Hopelessness and Risk of Mortality and Incidence of Myocardial Infarction and Cancer,” Psychosomatic Medicine 58, no. 2 (1996): 113–21.

36 Karl Menninger, “Hope,” American Journal of Psychiatry 116, no. 6 (1959): 481.

37 Ezra Stotland, The Psychology of Hope (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1959).

38 Scioli and Biller, Hope, 22.

39 Scioli and Biller, Hope, 22.

40 Snyder, Psychology. For Snyder’s epithet, see Gwinn and Hellman, Hope, 9.

41 Snyder, Psychology, 10.

42 Snyder, Psychology, 176–77, 189–90, 204–5.

43 You can take the test online here: The Hope Score, https://hopescore.com/hope-score/. Separate tests for children and for adult hope in specific subject areas are available in Gwinn and Hellman, Hope, 48.

44 Snyder, Psychology, 11, 323.

45 Snyder, Psychology, 211.

46 Snyder, Psychology, 224–27. In setting goals, he recommends: “I choose to…something positive [e.g., to get 8 hours of sleep], rather than “I will stop something negative [e.g., staying up late, watching screens]. In facing obstacles, he favors affirmative, empowering statements: “Now relax and take a few deep breaths” rather than “I can’t believe this is happening!” or “I have a lot of good experience” rather than “I am too old.”

47 “Kindling Hope In Adults” in Snyder, Psychology, 211–56.

48 Lopez, Making Hope Happen, 18–19.

49 Maria Sirois, “The Paradoxes of Hope: How the Worst Moments Create the Possibility for the Best,” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cxoX2Y7LJ5I.

50 Gwinn and Hellman, Hope, 162–63.

51 Adam D. I. Kramer, Jamie E. Guillory, and Jeffrey T. Hancock, “Experimental Evidence of Massive-Scale Emotional Contagion Through Social Networks,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Science 111, no. 24 (2014), 8788–90: and Lopez, Making Hope Happen, 146–48. Nicholas Christakis and Stephen Fowler, Connected: The Surprising Power of Our Social Networks and How They Shape Our Lives—How Your Friends’ Friends’ Friends Affect Everything You Feel, Think, and Do (New York: Little Brown, 2009). Gwinn and Hellman, Hope, 4 begin the volume with an inspiring story of how hope spread in a hospital. One physician came to this conclusion: “Hope became the bridge between the impossible and the possible.”

52 “Hope,” VIA Institute on Character, https://www.viacharacter.org/character-strengths/hope.

53 Gwinn and Hellman, Hope, Kindle edition, 214 of 4830.

54 Dan Tomasulo, Learned Hopefulness: Harnessing the Power of Positivity to Overcome Depression, Increase Motivation, and Build Unshakable Resilience (Oakland: New Harbinger Publications, 2020), 10.

55 Tomasulo, Learned Hopefulness, 10, citing Barbara L. Fredrickson, “Positive Emotions Broaden and Build,” in Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, ed. Patricia Divine and Ashby Plant (Burlington, MA: Academic Press, 2013), 47. Awe, gratitude, and compassion can be sparked by fear and/or disasters; see Jonah Paquette, Awestruck: How Embracing Wonder Can Make You Happier, Healthier, and More Connected (Boulder, CO: Shambhala, 2020), esp. ch. 6 (“The Darker Side of Awe”). Gratitude often arises in the face of potential or realized losses and is stirred both for volunteers and for survivors after a natural or human-made disaster. Loss and disasters also trigger compassion and often strengthen communal ties. (Think of the aftermath of 9/11 or the early days of the pandemic.)

56 Weddings, births, and scientific advances certainly give us hope! Tomasulo’s own model seems to argue that hope (in its highest form, at the top of his pyramid scale) can stem from imagination and a sense of possibility, not just from negativity or uncertainty. Rebecca Solnit, Hope in the Dark: Untold Histories, Wild Possibilities (Chicago: Haymarket, 2016), xiv views uncertainty as a welcome resource for agency and hope: “In the spaciousness of uncertainty is room to act.”

57 Tomasulo, Learned Hopefulness, 21.

58 Ben-Shahar, Happier, 163.

59 Kaye Herth, a hope researcher focused on nursing and palliative care, developed another hope instrument, the HHI, or Herth Hope Index, which measures for social connections and support, as well as goal-setting and the active pursuit of goals.

60 “When you tap into the belief that you can do something to turn your dream into reality, you’re tapping into energy and resilience, as well as creativity. These, along with the belief in your own power, will enable you to find ways to capitalize on opportunity and overcome obstacles as you reach for your goals”; see Annie McKee, How to Be Happy at Work (Boston: Harvard Business Review Press, 2017), 100–101.

61 Lopez, Making Hope Happen, 185.

62 The stages of teshuvah (“repentance”) work the same way. The laws of teshuvah are so powerful in part because they provide a sequenced model. This encourages people to let go of guilt when they “arrive at the top of the pyramid” and achieve teshuvah gemurah (complete repentance for a given sin). Teshuvah gemurah consists of facing the same or highly similar temptations, but responding differently than before (Maimonides, Hilkhot Teshuvah 2:1). Because of the structure, relapse does not mean that all is lost. One simply returns to the earlier stages: acknowledgment of a sin, oral confession for it, sincere expressions or regret, restitution to whatever degree possible, and a renewed resolution not to repeat the sin (Maimonides, Hilkhot teshuvah 2:2–5, 9–11). Similarly, on the hope pyramid, failure to reach one’s goals leads back to uncertainty and negativity, and the climb to higher stages can begin again.

63 Gwinn and Hellman, Hope, 196.

64 Tomasulo, Learned Hopefulness, 136–38.

65 Lopez, Making Hope Happen, 24.

66 Solnit, Hope; Joanna Macy and Chris Johnstone, Active Hope: How to Face the Mess We’re In With Unexpected Resilience and Creative Power, rev. ed. (Novato, CA: New World Library, 2022); Elin Kelsey, Hope Matters: Why Changing the Way We Think is Critical to Solving the Environmental Crisis (Berkeley, CA: Greystone, 2020); and Cleo Wade, Where to Begin: A Small Book about Your Power to Create Big Change in Our Crazy World (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2019).

67 Maria Sirois, Every Day Counts: Lessons in Love, Faith, and Resilience From Children Facing Illness (New York: Walker, 2006); Lucy Fettes, Stephen Ashford, and Matthew Maddock, Setting and Implementing Patient-Set Goals in Palliative Care (London: Cicely Saunders Institute of Palliative Care, Policy and Rehabilitation at King’s College, 2018). Rabbi Maurice Lamm, The Power of Hope: The One Essential of Life and Love (New York: Rawson, 1995), 132–33 writes about hope in the face of a terminal diagnosis and includes a list of “Seven Hopes to Hold On To When There Is Nothing to Hope For.” All seven include some measure of agency.

68 Deuteronomy 30 affirms human free will and the ready opportunity to repent, culminating in verse 19 with the choice before us today: to choose life or death, blessing or curse.

69 Martin E. P. Seligman et al., Homo Prospectus (New York: Oxford University Press: 2016) and Lopez, Making Hope Happen, 36. Psychologists and brain scientists coined the terms “chronesthesia” (“a capacity acquired by humans through evolution that allows them to be constantly aware of the past and the future”) and “autonoetic consciousness” (“the capacity to mentally represent and become aware of subjective experiences in the past, present, and future”); see Bridget Murray, “What Makes Mental Time Travel Possible?,” American Psychological Association (October 2003), https://www.apa.org/monitor/oct03/mental. In Genesis, the Creator made humans and not other animals in the image of the divine, endowing us with the ability to create as an act of will, consciousness, and vision. In the Jewish tradition, agency is also generally understood to be part of what distinguishes humans from angels, who do not have free will and must fulfill God’s assignments; see, e.g., Sforno on Genesis 1:26–27.

70 This refers to the New International Version translation of Psalm 55:23.

71 Of course, it is possible to invest hope in a greater power that is neutral (e.g., nature) or even evil (e.g., the devil or a cult leader). But the vast majority of people choose a benign, sustaining, and sacred power that, in many cases, religious thinkers would identify with God.

72 Arnow, Choosing Hope, 212.

73 Arnow, Choosing Hope, 7.

74 Gwinn and Hellman, Hope, 182–83. This is also a quote drawn on by Max Lucado, Unshakeable Hope: Building Our Love on the Promises of God (Memphis, TN: Thomas Nelson, 2018), 153.

75 Gwinn and Hellman, Hope, 31.

76 Crying out for a house to be spared that has already burned (or not burned) is considered to be a prayer made in vain. The status of the house is a fait accompli. See m. Berakhot 9:3.

77 m. Avot 4:18.

78 After I developed this theory, I read about philosopher Joseph Godfrey’s distinction between basic hope and directed hope, which bears some similarity to the hope of acceptance and the hope of agency, respectively; see Scioli and Biller, Hope, 28–29. Subsequently, I also discovered the concept of “object-oriented hope” which aligns with agency and “fundamental hope,” which aligns with acceptance; see Alan Mittleman, Hope in a Democratic Age: Philosophy, Religion, and Political Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 18.

79 To continue the reservoir/rain/cloud metaphor, people can also “collect” hope when blessings “rain down” on them, and then, when facing difficulties, “draw on” those memories—and on any skills or traits that helped to “seed” hope in the past. See below for a discussion of how the word tiqvah is associated with living waters and containers.

80 Martin Luther King, Jr., “Shattered Dreams,” Martin Luther King, Jr. Research and Education Institute, Stanford University, https://kinginstitute.stanford.edu/king-papers/documents/draft-chapter-x-shattered-dreams; see also King, “Unfulfilled Hopes,“ https://kinginstitute.st.

81 Here King evokes existential hope—the courage to be—and refers to Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966).

82 Mittleman, Hope, 6.

83 As noted, many religious people would identify these greater powers as expressions of the divine.

84 Andrew Robinson, “Did Einstein Really Say That?,” Nature (April 30, 2018), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-05004-4 and Martin Luther King, Jr. “I’ve Been to the Mountaintop,” AFSCME (April 3, 1968), https://www.afscme.org/about/history/mlk/mountaintop. This address was delivered the day before he was assassinated.

85 Lamm, Power, 171.

86 Milgram Goldie et al., Wisdom from Reb Zalman: Embracing the Jewish Spirit (New Rochelle, NY: Reclaiming Judaism, 2018), 212.

87 Lopez, Making Hope Happen, 169–79 talks about “borrowing hope,” “sharing hope,” “building networks of hope,” and “leading with hope.”

88 Ludwig Koehler and Walter Baumgartner, The Hebrew and Aramaic Lexicon of the Old Testament, study edition, 2 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 2:1082.

89 Koehler and Baumgartner, Hebrew and Aramaic Lexicon, 1:407.

90 Psalm 27 is recited throughout the High Holiday season, when Jews especially need hope that they can change themselves and the coming year for the better.

91 Arnow, Choosing Hope, xvii, 224.

92 High Holiday sermon delivered at Makom Ohr Shalom synagogue in Los Angeles, date uncertain (1994–2010).

93 Arnow, Choosing Hope, 221 cites British psychoanalyst Charles Rycroft, who “suggests that hope is an open system; like a river, it depends on inputs of rain, springs, and streams, but it feeds back nourishment to the surrounding environment.”

94 Especially before dukhening at Makom Ohr Shalom synagogue in Los Angeles, dates uncertain (1994–2010).

95 Interestingly, tiqvah is not named as its own middah (“virtue”) in most musar literature, but it is explored and elevated in relation to other virtues, particularly bitaḥon. Perhaps this is because tiqvah is so essential to all character improvement that it qualifies as a meta-middah. Hope that personal growth is possible is needed in order to engage in it vulnerably and faithfully. One modern mussarist goes so far as to say, “I have only one word to describe what mussar means to me: hope”; see Rabbi Yehuda Keilson, Mind Over Man: The Climb to Greatness (Lakewood, NJ: Israel Bookshop, 2017), 21. In discussing these matters, Rabbi Eric Gurvis shared with me a helpful essay on bitaḥon written by Rabbi David Jaffe and temporarily removed from the Musar Institute website. Jaffe wrote: “There is a classic debate in traditional Jewish sources….For Rabbi Yoseff Yuzel Horowitz, Bitaḥon meant a rock-solid belief that God would deliver what you needed, if you had enough trust. As difficult as this position sounds to the contemporary ear, it has strong support in classic Jewish sources…. For the Chazon Ish, Bitaḥon meant a belief that the events of our life and things that happen to us have ultimate meaning, even if we cannot discern that meaning or purpose from our limited perspective.” The latter understanding of bitaḥon is similar in many ways to the hope of acceptance.

96 Rashi explains the phrase in supremely hopeful and sobering language: ki veʿodo yeish bitaḥon shemme yashuv lifnei moto (“As long as [a person] is still alive…there is hope, for maybe [you] will repent/change before [you] die.”)

97 It is based on an illustration found at https://www.tasmeemme.com/store-items/vector-wellbehaved-girl-opening-door-to-elderly-man-saying-please-come-in-good-manners-politeness-of-male-kid-decenity-and-urbanity-of-children-concept/?item=10120920381, which he customized and which I gained permission to use.

98 Jonathan Sacks, “Future Tense,” Jonathan Sacks: The Rabbi Sacks Legacy (April 1, 2008), https://www.rabbisacks.org/archive/future-tense-how-the-jews-invented-hope/. See also Thomas Cahill, The Gifts of the Jews: How a Tribe of Desert Nomads Changed the Way Everyone Thinks and Feels (New York: Random House, 1998); Menninger, “Hope,” 483; and Mittleman, Hope, 16, 83–84.

99 Sacks, “Future Tense.” Of course, the English word “fate” is applied to Clotho, Lachesis, and Atropos, the three Fates of Greek mythology.

100 See, e.g., m. Avot 3:14; Deuteronomy 30:19; and Jonah 3:4.

101 Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi, Zakhor: Jewish History and Jewish Memory (New York: Schocken, 1982), 23–26 and Sacks, Future Tense, 243.

102 There is debate over what “this Torah/Instruction” includes, but it at least includes the previous few verses.

103 Gevalt is difficult to translate. It is an exclamation, meaning roughly “Heaven help us!” or “God protect us from such violence!”

104 The Hebrew text is available at https://learntorah.com/PeleYoetz/Pdf/Hebrew326.pdf. Thanks to Rabbi Eric Gurvis for directing me to this source.

105 Eliezer Berkovitz, Major Themes in Modern Philosophies of Judaism (New York: Ktav, 1974), ch.2; the text of this volume is available on Sefaria.org. He refers to a widely told story that Franz Rosenzweig, when challenged with the question “Do you lay tefillin?” answered, “Not yet.” The “eternal now” refers to Rosenzweig’s theory of repetition in The Star of Redemption. For example, Sinai happened in the past and is also always happening now.

106 “[K]ey narratives, concepts, texts, prayers, and practices in Judaism…have sustained hope for the Jewish people over the ages and, when viewed through an appropriate lens, can do so for us”; see Arnow, Choosing Hope, xxii.

107 Sacks, Future Tense, 247–48, 250.

108 The word bitsaron is a hapax legomenon with uncertain meaning. It has been identified as Jerusalem, a specific fortress in Samaria, or any fortress. “Fortress” can also be understood as a name for God. Bitaḥon, as seen above, is sometimes a synonym for “hope.” I therefore wonder if the word bitsaron could be a scribal error for bitaḥon: “Return to faith in the future, you prisoners of hope.” Whether the people are encouraged to return to a bedrock of faith, to Zion/Jerusalem, to a fortress at another location, or even to God, the overall message is that hope resides in a power greater and more stable than the people, their wishes, their sins, or their goals.

109 The paradox of being bound or imprisoned by hope recalls a more lighthearted but similar expression by Isaac Bashevis Singer, “Promised City,” City Journal (Summer 1997), https://www.city-journal.org/html/isaac-singer%E2%80%99s-promised-city-11935.html: “We must believe in free will, we have no choice.”

110 “The Top 10 Most-Searched Bible Verses: What’s Missing?,” Bible Gateway (January 24, 2011), https://www.biblegateway.com/blog/2011/01/the-top-10-most-searched-bible-verses-whats-missing/.

111 Sacks, Future Tense, 246.

112 In liturgical readings, this verse is repeated after the conclusion of the book, ensuring that we end on a hopeful note. Referring specifically to hope as it is understood in the Bible, Mittleman, Hope, 14 writes: “Hope is not always about change. It is also about conserving the practices and institutions that support meaning, which have been inherited in the past and still endure in the present.”

113 See above, including footnote 72.

114 Sacks, Future Tense, 253 writes movingly about the remarkable resilience and even hopefulness of Holocaust survivors. Arnow, Choosing Hope, 208 cites Steve Lipman, author of Laughter in Hell: The Use of Humor during the Holocaust and identifies humor as “the currency of hope” during the Shoah. He also summarizes the importance of hope among theologians and philosophers who write about the Holocaust, including Richard Rubenstein, Emil Fackenheim, and Irving Greenberg (95–102).

115 Rabbi Joseph Telushkin, Jewish Humor: What the Best Jewish Jokes Say About the Jews (New York: HarperCollins, 1998), 26. To Jonathan Sacks, “Rabbi Sacks on Optimism v. Hope,” Jonathan Sacks: The Rabbi Sacks Legacy, https://www.rabbisacks.org/videos/rabbi-sacks-on-optimism-vs-hope-jinsider/ (originally published JInsider, March 2010), the word “optimism” signifies passivity, and the word “hope” signifies agency. Sacks’s collection of radio essays confirms this use of terms and focus on agency: Jonathan Sacks, From Optimism to Hope: BBC Thoughts for the Day (London: Bloomsbury, 2004).

116 Consider kibbutzim, women in political leadership, desalination, start-ups, and the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel.

117 Faith includes doubt, otherwise, it would be called “certainty.” The same can be said for hope.

118 Salo W. Baron, “Newer Emphases in Jewish History,” Jewish Social Studies 25, no. 4 (1963): 245–58.

119 Telushkin, Jewish Humor, 25.

120 Roger Kamenetz, The Jew in the Lotus: A Poet’s Rediscovery of Jewish Identity in Buddhist India (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1994), 2.

121 Sacks, Future Tense, 252.

122 Tal Ben-Shahar, “Let’s Suffer from Post-Traumatic Growth,” Psychology Today (July 7, 2020), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/the-art-whole-being/202007/let-s-suffer-post-traumatic-growth.

123 Kelsey, Hope, 12.

124 Jon D. Levenson, Resurrection and the Restoration of Israel: The Ultimate Victory of the God of Life (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 2006), 163 quoted in Arnow, Choosing Hope, 131.

125 Ibn Ezra interprets verse 31 to mean that hopeful people are regularly exchanging one iteration of godly strength for another, so that they never become depleted: “Even before one strength runs out, another comes to them from God.” This highlights the power of the hope of acceptance, which, unlike the hope of agency, is not easily exhausted.

126 This is important because willpower has proven to be a consumable resource. Roy F. Baumeister et al., “Ego Depletion: Is the Active Self a Limited Resource?,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 74, no. 5 (1998): 1252–65.

127 Lopez, Making Hope Happen, 24.

128 Paquette, Happiness Toolbox, ch. 7. Gina Delucca and Jamie Goldstein, Positive Psychology in Practice: Simple Tools to Pursue Happiness and Live Authentically (Emeryville, CA: Rockridge, 2020), 116ff.

129 The wording is deliberately ambiguous regarding when in the future to direct one’s imagination. Laura King of the University of Missouri invented the exercise. Preparatory instructions are provided at “Best Possible Self,” Greater Good in Action, https://ggia.berkeley.edu/practice/best_possible_self.

130 Negativity bias refers to the human tendency to notice and dwell on what is missing or wrong more than on what goes well. According to Rick Hanson, Hardwiring Happiness: The New Brain Science of Contentment, Calm, and Confidence (New York: Harmony, 2013), 31, “The brain is like Velcro for negative experiences but Teflon for positive ones.” Evolutionary biologists point out that ancient people were harmed far more by failing to notice one menacing saber-toothed tiger than by failing to notice one succulent berry bush. Miss a bush, and you forage another day. Miss a tiger, and you will be foraged. We are the descendants of ancestors whose negativity bias helped them survive.

131 Lopez, Making Hope Happen, 19–20.

132 Gwinn and Hellman, Hope, 39–40.

133 See footnotes 46 and 62, above.

134 Lopez, Making Hope Happen, 54.

135 Jonathan Sacks, “The Heroism of Ordinary Life,” Jonathan Sacks: The Rabbi Sacks Legacy (5768), https://www.rabbisacks.org/covenant-conversation/lech-lecha/the-heroism-of-ordinary-life/.

136 Genesis 12:1–2. Abraham lifts up his eyes to find hope in Genesis 12:1; 13:14; 15:5; 22:4, 13.

137 Rabbi Rachel Barenblatt, “The Strength to Help Each Other Hope,” Velveteen Rabbi (September 7, 2021), https://velveteenrabbi.blogs.com/blog/2021/09/help-hope.html.

138 Theologian Harvey Cox, The Feast of Fools (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969), 157 calls laughter “hope’s last weapon” (quoted in Arnow, Choosing Hope, 216, 273).

Categories
Vol. 67, No. 1 (Winter 2022-23)

A Forgotten Pesach Ritual (pdf)

Download PDF

Download PDF

Categories
Vol. 67, No. 1 (Winter 2022-23)

A Forgotten Pesach Ritual

A fundamental principle of all classical rabbinic exegesis is that the Torah never repeats itself pointlessly, that there is always some point for the reiteration of any detail at all that appears, or that seems to appear, more than once in the text.1 One famous example of how the rabbis of old applied this principle is on prominent display in the Passover Haggadah, where each of the Torah’s repeated references to latter-day Israelites telling the story of Passover to their children is taken to refer to a distinct and at least slightly dissimilar obligation to address the children separately and differently based on their level of intellectual ability and emotional engagement. Although there is no suggestion in Scripture that these are meant to be different kinds of children, the Haggadah imagines them as such: three whose levels of curiosity vary and one too inarticulate even to formulate a question in the first place.2 The passage in the Haggadah is famous and known to all who have ever attended a Passover seder. But in the context of Scripture itself, those passages are not about different kinds of children and their varying levels of interest and engagement at all; rather, they are about how the different rituals connected with the holiday are intended to provoke the kind of natural curiosity that will lead children to inquire about its backstory. One, the last, supposes a child—one who morphs into the Haggadah’s wise one—looking out at the whole complex of Passover rituals and asking what scriptural passages underlie their detail.3 But the other three single out specific rituals intended by their very nature to arouse the interest of less exegetically curious children.

The first is the transformation into an annual ritual of the detail from the story about the Israelites slaughtering lambs and kids and using the blood to paint the doorposts and lintels of their homes. There is indeed a lot in that story to pique the curiosity of young onlookers. For example, the narrative features families slaughtering those animals in a non-sacrificial context and then preparing the meat of those animals for consumption by themselves according to certain specific rules, whereas the eventual ritual will require slaughter in the context of sacrifice. Also mysterious is the way that some of the rituals ordained for the original consumers of the flesh of the slaughtered animals became laws for all time—for example, the meat must be roasted whole, its bones unbroken, and eaten matsot ʿal merorim (whatever that means)—but others did not; the Israelites in Egypt were told to consume the lamb or kid with their staffs in their hands and their hiking boots (or at least their shoes) on their feet, and to gobble it down quickly, but those details failed to become ritualized for future generations to mimic (Exodus 12:8 and 11, respectively). But most challenging of all is the detail, both fully present and totally ignored in the scriptural narrative, that God clearly had no trouble keeping the Israelites safe when inflicting the nine other plagues on Egypt, thus raising the question of why the Israelites had to mark their homes with blood at all.4

And so we find the first of three ritual-specific questions in Exodus 12:26: “And so, when your children ask what this whole commemorative undertaking means to you, you shall answer, ‘This is the Passover sacrifice to the Eternal One Who passed over the houses of the Israelites in Egypt to smite the Egyptians while making safe our own homes.’”5 That question ends up memorialized in the Haggadah as the question of the obstreperous child, but in context it simply supposes that all the disconnects between the scriptural narrative and the latter-day ritual will productively confuse young observers (who presumably have not gotten so used to the details that they can still see the trees and not solely the forest) and prompt them to ask what it is all intended to mean.

The second has to do with the substitution of matzah for bread for the full week of the festival. This, too, is presented in the text in a way that children will find confusing. Exodus 12:39 more or less says that the Israelites left Egypt with such obedient alacrity that they did not even have time to linger long enough for their dough to rise and so, having no choice, they baked it in its unrisen form to create matzah. It is a famous explanation, but it does not make all that much sense that the Israelites would occupy themselves between dining and departing Egypt by baking rather than by packing and taking leave of their neighbors, as we would expect them to.6 Nor does it seem clear how to connect the note in Exodus 12:8 to the effect that the Israelites were instructed weeks before leaving Egypt that the paschal beast, once slaughtered and its blood drained, must be eaten with matzah. So, too, can the presence of matzah on the seder table trigger a teaching moment, one specifically directed at children:

Matzah cakes shall be eaten for all seven days; indeed, there shall be seen in your midst no leavened foodstuffs nor shall even any leavening agent be seen anywhere within your borders. And you shall tell this story to your children on that day, saying “All this is because of that which the Almighty did for me by bringing me forth from Egypt” (Exodus 13:7–8).7

In the Haggadah, perhaps because matzah is the sole trigger symbol that has nothing to do with dead animals or dead children, this ends up as the response offered to the child who fails even to ask what is going on. Why scare such a passive, uninquisitive child until absolutely necessary?

And the third ritual is pidyon haben, the redemption of the firstborn sons of Israel. This eventually turns into the question of the Haggadah’s simple child, but, in its scriptural context, pidyon haben is presented as the kind of ritual that will by its nature arouse the curiosity of children, thus creating the context in which to tell them about the exodus:

Furthermore, when the Almighty finally brings you to the land of the Canaanite…and formally gives it over to you, you shall respond by offering to the Almighty the first living thing to emerge from every human womb, as well as the first to emerge from the womb of every animal you own. Indeed, in both cases shall such a male belong to the Almighty. The first to emerge from a donkey’s womb, however, shall be redeemed with a lamb. If you fail to redeem it, then you must break its neck instead. But all human firstborn among your sons must be redeemed. And so shall it come to pass that, when your child one day asks you, “What is all this about?,” you shall answer by saying, ‘With a mighty hand did the Almighty bring us forth from Egypt, from the house of bondage. And, indeed, when Pharaoh was recalcitrant about sending us forth, the Almighty responded by killing every firstborn male in the land of Egypt, both human and animal. And it is for that specific reason that I both offer up to God the firstborn male of every animal as a sacrifice and redeem the firstborn among our children. And this act shall be a sign upon your hand and a symbol between your eyes, for the Almighty brought us forth from Egypt with a mighty hand (Exodus 13:11–16, emphasis mine).8

So that seems clear enough. Three rituals are deemed weird or peculiar enough to arouse the natural inquisitiveness of children: the ingestion of the paschal offering, the substitution of matzah for bread on the dinner table, and the obligation to sacrifice or redeem firstborn animals but always to redeem firstborn Israelite sons. These three things are ordained by Scripture precisely to guarantee that the story of Israel’s redemption from bondage to Pharaoh in Egypt is never forgotten.

But that in turn raises a different question, one that will have already occurred to readers familiar with Jewish life. It hardly bears saying that the seder meal—all that is left of the paschal sacrifice in our Temple-less day—is a Passover ritual. (This is so obvious that it seems odd even to write it out. What else could it be?) And just as universally known, including by non-Jews, is the connection of matzah with Passover. But who thinks of pidyon haben as a Passover ritual? The answer—no one at all—has to do with the fact that it is not, in fact, a Passover ritual and that, despite the clear and plain sense of the passage cited above from Exodus 13, there is no concept in today’s Jewish world of families, say, bringing their newborn sons to a local kohen on the eve of Passover each year formally to fulfill the injunction to use the redemption of the firstborn to create just the kind of bizarre ritual that will get children interested enough to ask the question to which the answer will be that God passed over the homes of the Israelites when setting out to smite the firstborn of Egypt, which act led directly to Pharaoh, whose son also died that night, finally allowing the Israelites to leave.9 Yet that is certainly the most obvious way to read the passage, taking the ritual later known as pidyon haben as a Passover ritual like the others intended to arouse the curiosity of children and create the context for telling them the story of the exodus.10

There is evidence to suggest that such a ritual actually did exist in the Second Temple period, although the reference is in a part of Scripture that is never read out loud in synagogue and rarely studied by anyone other than academic students of the biblical text. Nehemiah ben Hakhaliah, a kind of wine steward to the king of Persia living in the middle of the fifth century BCE, tells the story of his life and work openly and very appealingly in the scriptural book that bears his name.11 It happened one day that a traveler from the Land of Israel—at the time, a province of the Persian Empire—arrived in Shushan, the capital city, and reported to Nehemiah that things were not going well for the Jews of Yehud. The gates to Jerusalem that had been burned when the Babylonians sacked the city almost a century and half earlier had never been repaired and neither had the walls of the city been rebuilt. Nehemiah responds to this by bursting into tears and then turning to God in prayer. A few months pass. And then, when the king finally notices how downcast his steward is and asks him what the matter might be, Nehemiah screws up his courage and asks for permission to head west to Jerusalem and there personally oversee the rebuilding of the city’s walls.

Many adventures ensue. The non-Jewish locals are actively hostile. But somehow the work gets done and, after only fifty-two days of work, the walls have been successfully repaired.12 Nehemiah has the idea that this kind of structural renewal needs to inspire in its wake some kind of spiritual recommitment as well. And so, on the first day of the seventh month, the day latter-day Jews know as Rosh Hashanah, Ezra—who has been absent from the narrative, but who was apparently still in town—is brought forward to read “the scroll of the Torah of Moses which God had bequeathed to Israel” (Nehemiah 8:1).13 An elaborate recommitment ceremony ensues as Nehemiah steps forward specifically to mention those laws of the Torah that the people must now agree to obey in order to signal their renewed commitment, all of them presumably rules and rituals that had somehow fallen into desuetude and were now being brought back as the meat and potatoes of the people’s renewed commitment to God’s law.14

The rules he lists will, for the most part, seem familiar to modern Jews: a commitment to endogamy, a return to strict observance of Shabbat and the sabbatical year, and a willing commitment to pay an annual tax to the Temple.15 Others are more obscure. For example, he cites the obligation to provide wood for the Temple altar as a commandment from the Torah.16 And then, having begun to mention annual rituals and commitments, he mentions the following several:

and to bring annually to the Temple the first fruits of our land—which is to say the first of every kind of fruit from every kind of tree that grows in our land, as well as our firstborn sons and the firstborn of our livestock as is written in the Torah—including the firstborn of our cattle and our sheep: to bring them [all] to the Temple [and to hand them over] to the priests who serve there, in the Temple (Nehemiah 10:36–37, emphasis mine).17

The passage can be read in lots of different ways. He goes on to talk about paying a tax on dough as well as something he calls terumah taxes, as well as taxes on fruit, wine, and oil, which he says must be delivered to the priests who serve in the Temple chambers devoted to the collection of such taxes. But what are we to make of the reference to the redemption of firstborn sons as an annual Temple ritual? Is Nehemiah simply reading the Torah and determining, as I suggested above, that pidyon haben was intended to be an annual ceremony in which families bring their firstborn sons to the Temple to be redeemed by priests, thereby provoking older children to ask about the point of the ritual? One could certainly read the passage to say that. Or is he saying that this ritual was actually known to him, that the commitment renewal ceremony over which he was presiding was going to require a return to various rituals and practices that had fallen away over the years? One could certainly read the text that way, too. It is not necessarily important that Nehemiah fails to connect this annual redemption ritual explicitly with Passover. The ritual of bringing the firstfruits of one’s harvest to the Temple took place on Shavuot, but Nehemiah does not mention that either. The far more important point is that he describes both of the above as annual rituals observed in the Temple by people who travel to that place to do that thing.18

So was Nehemiah’s comment reportage or exegesis? David J. A. Clines published a fascinating essay decades ago in which he described Nehemiah 10 as “a small treasure house of post-exilic interpretations of earlier Israelite law.”19 That could well be, but to read Nehemiah as calling upon his audience to observe a law that the man merely felt ought to have existed and not one he knew once actually to have been a feature of Temple life—that seems at best a strange way to create a context for people to demonstrate their allegiance to the Torah and its laws. Therefore, I choose the latter possibility as the most likely.

The ritual redemption of the firstborn sons of Israel is mentioned several other times in the Torah, none of which contradicts my reading of the passage from Exodus 13 above. After the incident of the golden calf, for example, Moses is told to carve two tablets like the first ones so that God can inscribe upon them the same words that were on the first set. This Moses does, lugging the tablets up to the top of the mountain, whereupon God descends to earth in a cloud and an extended colloquy begins.20 God reveals some divine attributes. Moses prostrates himself and in that position begs for forgiveness for the people. Apparently convinced, or at least mollified, God decides to renew—or at least not to cancel—the covenant, but certain of its terms are mentioned specifically, presumably to indicate their status as deal-breakers: God will still drive the Canaanites from Canaan, but the Israelites are going to have to hew to certain specific instructions in return. Among those crucial rules are these:

Observe the Festival of Matzah annually in the month of Aviv by eating matzah for seven days just as I have commanded you, for it was in the month of Aviv that you set forth from Egypt. The firstborn out of every womb belongs to me, as do the firstborn males of your oxen and sheep. The firstborn donkey, however, you shall redeem by replacing it with a lamb. Alternately, you may break the donkey’s neck, but every firstborn among your sons you must redeem, for you may not come into My presence empty-handed (Exodus 34:18–20).

Since the notion of coming into God’s presence empty-handed is an unambiguous reference to the custom of participating in one of the three annual pilgrimages to Jerusalem, is this passage not saying—and clearly—that the redemption of human firstborn sons is to be part of annual festival observance?21 It certainly sounds that way, even if it does not explicitly say that the point of the ritual is to trigger questioning by children about the larger history of the exodus from Egypt.22

We are used to reading the remaining references to firstborn sons being redeemed in the Torah in light of later practice, but the remaining ones either support the connection with Passover or at least do not contradict it. In the beginning of the book of Numbers, for example, we read that the firstborn were formally decommissioned, if that is the right word, from being “owned” by God:

As for Me, I am personally selecting the Levites from amidst the Israelites in place of all the firstborn—or at least in place of those firstborn sons of Israel who “opened” their mothers’ wombs at birth—so that they shall henceforth belong to Me just as has every firstborn son been Mine since the day on which I struck out at all the firstborn sons of the land of Egypt, thus simultaneously sanctifying unto Myself every firstborn in Israel, both human and animal. They are all Mine, and I Myself am the Eternal (Numbers 3:12–13).

This is not presented as mere theorizing either. The text actually goes so far as to present Moses being shown a practical way to deal with the problematic detail that there were precisely 273 more firstborn-of-their-mothers sons among the Israelites than there were eligible-to-serve men of the tribe of Levi and how to go about redeeming the firstborn into whose sandals there were no Levites available to step.23 The important point here is that this is specifically not a reference to the commandment to redeem the firstborn sons of Israel—nor would it make any sense to read it that way; since Levitical status was inherited, why would any subsequent generation of firstborn sons have to be redeemed at all once the initial transfer of belongingness to God has been achieved?24

Yet, when Scripture returns one final time to the ongoing obligation to redeem firstborn sons, the passage is a strange one. God is unambiguously depicted as speaking directly to Aaron, the high priest of Israel. (Use of second person throughout the oracle makes sense only if Aaron is the one being addressed.) So God instructs Aaron as follows:

Every womb-opening creature of any type that be brought nigh unto the Almighty, be it beast or human, shall be yours with the proviso that you redeem both human firstborn and the firstborn of unclean animals. This redemption shall take place when the creature-to-be-redeemed is at least one month old and the amount to be paid as the redemption price shall be five shekels according to the [weight of] holy shekels, which is to say the kind equal to twenty geirahs (Numbers 18:15–18).25

The text then goes on to explain in detail how Aaron is to deal with pure—namely, sacrificeable—animals.

Moderns familiar with contemporary Jewish practice read through this passage and see confirmed the law requiring that pidyon haben be done only for a child older than thirty days.26 But the text here says something quite different—namely, that firstborn sons must be brought to Aaron (here standing in for the priests of any generation) and handed over precisely in the same way that firstborn animals must be. The difference between the two is, of course, not negligible: animals that are impure—that cannot be sacrificed—and children are to be redeemed by the priests themselves and then presumably returned to their parents. Who can say whether that means that the priests facilitate the redemption by accepting the five shekels from the infant’s parents or, as the text seems to say, they themselves are to redeem such babies before returning them?27 But the fact remains that there are no passages in the Torah that contradict the plain meaning of the passage from Exodus 13 cited above to the effect that the parents of babies who are the firstborn to their mothers are to be brought to the Temple and there redeemed (by someone!) as part of the ritual run-up to Passover, and this was intended to serve as a kind of trigger ritual that will prompt the kinds of questions that parents can answer by telling the story of Israel’s exodus from Egypt.

What happened to pidyon haben as a Passover ritual is an excellent question. Perhaps as the Jewish world spread out into the diaspora, it was simply no longer possible to bring every firstborn child all the way to Jerusalem to be redeemed. Perhaps the reality of a Levitical priesthood in Jerusalem made the notion that firstborn sons still, after so many generations, needed formally to be decommissioned from the priesthood lose traction among the pious. Once the Temple was destroyed, rescheduling the pidyon ceremony for the thirty-first day of a boy’s life would certainly have been one of many adjustments enacted or informally adopted to speak to the new normal and to preserve what were then understood as rituals rooted in hoariest antiquity regardless of how they needed to be revised and revamped. In any event, the custom developed its own rules and was eventually detached completely from Passover. Is that something to regret? Maybe it is!28

Martin S. Cohen, Ph.D., is Rabbi of the Shelter Rock Jewish Center in Roslyn, New York, and a past editor of this journal.


1 See, e.g., Rava’s comment about shnei ketuvim habaʾim kʾeḥad (i.e., two verses that appear to say the same thing) in b. Arakhin 14b.

2 Whether the child who does not know how to ask a question is handicapped or merely bored to the point of being totally disengaged is not obvious from the context. Perhaps we are to imagine a child too young to be able even to formulate such a question.

3 Deuteronomy 6:20–25.

4 This is made explicit in some plague stories (e.g., Exodus 10:23 with respect to the ninth plague or Exodus 9:26 with respect to the eighth), but it is to be presumed even when not mentioned in so many words. How could the Egyptians possibly have gotten the message if the same disaster that befell the oppressor also befell the oppressed?

5 In context, the question is clearly about the slaughter of the paschal lamb or kid.

6 I have always assumed that the male and female friends mentioned in Exodus 11:2 (cf. 12:35) were neighbors, although the text does not say that in so many words. Who else could they be?

7 In Ḥumash kol hator, my forthcoming translation of the Torah with full commentary, I print the four-letter name of God in Hebrew letters just as it appears in the original text, allowing readers in translation to have the same experience that Hebrew-language readers have when encountering it in the original, where it is substituted with either Adonai or Hashem depending on context. Here, I just use “the Almighty” as a placeholder to denote the four-letter name.

8 I here follow the commentary of Rashbam on Exodus 13:9 (s.v. leʾot ʿal yadekha and bein ʿeinekha) and assume that the instruction to place something on one’s arm and between one’s eyes is a reference not to tefillin, but to the mitzvah of redeeming the firstborn. I assume that Rashbam would have said the same of verse 16—namely, that it needs to be read in light of verse 15.

9 In ancient times, parents of firstborn sons would presumably have brought the child to the Temple to be formally redeemed by a priest in that place. See below. It is true that the Torah does not specifically say that this questioning is formally to be scheduled for the eve of Passover, but that feels implied by the context; when else would a child see the qorban pesaḥ being served for dinner or matzah on the table, if not on the eve of Passover? So it does not seem too far a stretch to imagine the redemption ceremony also being scheduled precisely at the right time to provoke the question that will create the context for fulfilling the mitzvah of telling the story of the exodus from Egypt on the first night of Passover. Also worth considering is the repeated reference (in Exodus 13:3, 4, and 8) to the mitzvah having to do with “this day,” presumably from context the night of the exodus itself, what Jews today call ʿerev Pesaḥ. On this, see the recent discussion by David Henshke, Mah nishtanah? Leil Pesaḥ Betalmudam shel Ḥakhamim (Jerusalem: Magnes, 2016), 23–27 about the question of when precisely the mitzvah of telling the story of the exodus devolves upon the faithful. I am grateful to Rabbi Rivon Krygier of Paris, my friend of many years, for drawing my attention to this section of Professor Henshke’s book. Also worth considering in this regard is the opinion of Amos Hakham in his Daʿat Miqra commentary to Exodus (Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook, 1998), 1:272, who suggests that the simple meaning of the text does not assign the mitzvah of telling children the story of the exodus from Egypt is ongoing and not tied specifically to Passover at all. The two references in the book of Joshua (4:6 and 21) are, to my mind, the exceptions that prove the rule; a strange ritual is undertaken to provoke children to ask how Israel managed to cross the Jordan into the Land of Israel, which makes the obligation to set up the stones that will provoke those questions parallel to the things the Torah instructs adults to do to provoke a similar line of questioning about the exodus from Egypt.

10 Tradition actually did evolve in such a way as to bring the firstborn to synagogue on the eve of Passover either to fast together as a sign of self-identification with the spared Israelite firstborn in Egypt or, far more normally, to relieve themselves of the burden of such a fast by participating in a seʿudat mitsvah of some sort, usually one connected with the successful completion of a talmudic tractate by themselves or at least by someone in the room. The fact that that tradition does bring together the noninfant firstborn sons of Israel, but specifically not as part of a mass pidyon haben ritual to redeem the previous year’s firstborn, is part of the riddle and not at all its solution. The detail that Pharaoh’s own son died that night is made explicit in Scripture in Exodus 12:29. Readers unfamiliar with the modern-day version of the pidyon haben ceremony will enjoy the description by Richard L. Rubenstein, Power Struggle: An Autobiographical Confession (New York: Scribner’s, 1974), 112–13 and his very funny riff on the ceremony and its implications. Alternatively, the modern ceremony is described more soberly by Carl N. Astor, The Observant Life, ed. Martin S. Cohen and Michael Katz (New York: Rabbinical Assembly, 2012), 249–51.

11 The vague reference to “the twentieth year” in Nehemiah 1:1 has to be read in light of the more precise remarks in 2:1, 5:14, and 13:6, where Artaxerxes’s name appears. (The twentieth year of the reign of Artaxerxes I was 445–44 BCE.) There is endless debate among scholars regarding the dates of Ezra and Nehemiah, but the best summary that I have come across is Joseph Blenkinsopp., Ezra-Nehemiah: A Commentary (Lexington, KY: Westminster/John Knox, 1988), 139–44 (excursus titled “Additional Note on the Chronology of Ezra and Nehemiah”). The term translated here as “wine steward” is the Hebrew mashqeh (literally “pourer”), which is precisely how Nehemiah depicts himself in the opening lines of the second chapter of his book.

12 Fifty-two days of work: Nehemiah 6:15.

13 Whether this is our Torah precisely is unclear. No one seems to know that the first day of the seventh month is a holiday. (Ezra and Nehemiah are depicted in Nehemiah 8:9–10 as telling that to the assembled specifically.) When the people hear the text read to them, they seem eager to observe Sukkot, but there is no reference to Yom Kippur, which falls between Rosh Hashanah and Sukkot. When they do observe Sukkot, they are depicted as taking up the four kinds of vegetation modern Jews wave around during Hallel and using them instead as the walls and roofing of their sukkot. Still, the simple meaning of the text of Nehemiah is that the Torah was brought forward by Ezra and read aloud. If there were later iterations of the text that introduced ideas previously unpromulgated, Nehemiah appears to know nothing about them. Also, when he speaks later about levying a tax to support the work of the Temple, he gives the figure as a third of a shekel annually, which seems inconsonant with the half-shekel mentioned over and over in Exodus 30. Questions regarding the historicity of the story of Ezra’s presence in Jerusalem during Nehemiah’s first sojourn there are a matter of endless scholarly debate, but the simplest way to read the relevant texts is to suppose that Ezra came to Jerusalem in the seventh year of Artaxerxes’s reign (Ezra 7:8, cf. v. 12) and that Nehemiah followed in the twentieth year of that same king’s reign (Nehemiah 2:1). The book of Nehemiah unselfconsciously presents both personalities as being present in the city at the same time at Nehemiah 8:9 (cf. 12:36).

14 “Commitment” seems to be the right word; see Robert Alter, The Hebrew Bible, 3 vols. (New York: Norton, 2019), 3:853, who translates Nehemiah 10:1 as “With all this, we make a solemn commitment and write it down, sealed—our officers, our Levites, our priests.”

15 See, respectively, Nehemiah 10:31, 32, and 33–34. See note 12 above about the amount.

16 Nehemiah 10:35. Regarding Nehemiah’s unexpected assertion that providing wood for the altar is an obligation recorded in the Torah (kakatuv batorah in the original), see the very interesting essay by Alex P. Jassen, “The Wood Offering Celebration—‘As Written in the Torah,’” TheTorah.com, https://www.thetorah.com/article/the-wood-offering-celebration-as-written-in-the-torah. The text notes that they determined who would procure the wood was by casting lots but is not clear whether this was just the way they chose to decide how to assign the task or whether Nehemiah took the casting of lots to be part of the scriptural commandment itself.

17 This seems to me the simplest way to read the text. It would also be possible to take the phrase shanah beshanah (“annually”; literally “year after year”) to apply only to the plants and livestock but not to the children, but that seems a less likely way to read the text.

18 The text of Deuteronomy 26:1–11 does not connect the bikkurim ritual with Shavuot either. Nor does it say specifically that it is to be an annual ritual. On the other hand, the concept of it being connected with the agricultural cycle of events in ancient Israel strongly suggests that this would have to be an annual obligation. (What else would it be?) Still, it is impossible to say when precisely the connection between bikkurim and Shavuot was established. For what it is worth, Nehemiah returns twice again to the topic of bikkurim (in 12:44 and 13:5) and in neither place connects the ritual of bringing those firstfruits with Shavuot.

19 David J. A. Clines, “Nehemiah 10 as an Example of Early Jewish Biblical Exegesis,” Journal for the Study of the Old Testament 21 (1981): 111.

20 That Moses hews the stones at the base of the mountain and then lugs them up to the top is made explicit in Exodus 34:4.

21 There are three annual pilgrimages to Jerusalem; see Exodus 23:17; 34:23; and Deuteronomy 16:16.

22 It is not clear whether the gender-specific later tradition—only firstborn sons, not daughters, end up being redeemed according to traditional rabbinic norms—would apply to the ritual itself, especially given the fact that classical Hebrew typically uses masculine plural to denote people of both sexes.

23 The solution is to redeem the 273 at a rate of five shekels per firstborn, then to hand over the total—which is calculated correctly in Numbers 3:50 as a total of 1,365 shekels—to Aaron and his sons.

24 In other words, if most of the firstborn had been traded up for Levites and the rest had been redeemed for cash, and if Levitical status is inherited, then why should future firstborn bear any obligation at all?

25 I am taking kol peter reḥem lekhol basar to include all living things, human and animal, in the law. The text does not explain what holy shekels are; readers are clearly expected to know, just as they are expected to know what a geirah is.

26 In fact, the custom is to schedule the ceremony—if at all possible—for the child’s thirty-first day of life. The ins and outs of the thirty-day rule are explored in great detail by Maimonides, Hilkhot bikkurim, ch. 11.

27 In this latter case, the idea would be that the firstborn already belong to God and are thus the property of God’s priests. The priest would then redeem the child from service and return it to its parents.

28 And I say that both as a bekhor and as a kohen.

Categories
Vol. 67, No. 1 (Winter 2022-23)

A Philosopher Explains What Belief in God Means (pdf)

Download PDF

Download PDF

Categories
Vol. 67, No. 1 (Winter 2022-23)

A Philosopher Explains What Belief in God Means

One important way in which Judaism differs from its daughter religions, Christianity and Islam, is that the latter are creedal religions, while Judaism is not—that is, they have official statements of belief that one must affirm to be a Christian or Muslim. Specifically, unless you believe that Jesus is Christ in some understanding of that term, you cannot be a Christian (and unless you believe a specific version of that claim, you cannot be a Catholic or Protestant). Similarly, unless you believe that there is only one God and Muhammad is his primary prophet, you cannot be a Muslim. You may have been raised in a family or country in which most people believe those things, and you may share ethnic characteristics with such people, but you are not a Christian or Muslim unless you personally affirm each of those religion’s beliefs.

Judaism is not like that. There are certainly Jewish beliefs about God, human nature, the relationships between God and human beings, and the relationships of both God and human beings to the world, but there is no one accepted formulation of those beliefs. In fact, Rabbi Louis Jacobs, z″l, catalogued multiple versions among later Jewish thinkers of each of the thirteen beliefs listed by Maimonides, Joseph Albo wrote that only three beliefs were at the heart of Judaism, and Hasdai Crescas thought that only one conviction, the love and fear of God, was at the core of Jewish belief.1 More to the point, Jewish identity is not a function of belief; it is determined by being born to a Jewish woman or reborn into the Jewish religion and community through the rites of conversion. This raises its own problems, embedded in the multiple debates among Jews, in Jewish law, and in the laws of the State of Israel as to who is a Jew, but what is clear is that beliefs are not at the heart of that question. Because of this, in fact, only with difficulty have Jews managed to exclude those born to a Jewish woman but who believe in Jesus as Christ.

Even with these difficulties, most Jews are happy that Jewish identity is not defined by belief, for that would be restrictive. It would also undermine the deep humility that Judaism embraces about what any one person—or, for that matter, all of us together—can know about anything. We definitely must seek whatever we can know, but the approved way of gaining as much knowledge as we can is not by simply accepting any particular formulation but rather by arguing about what to believe with our fellow Jews and with those outside our faith. Indeed, again as Rabbi Jacobs demonstrated, even those who accepted Maimonides’s formulation of Jewish beliefs disagreed so much about what each of them means that one wonders whether their agreement to his list is actually agreement at all. We Jews instead love to argue about how to understand God, human beings, the environment, and the interactions among them. As my colleague at American Jewish University, Michael Berenbaum, is fond of saying, “We Jews believe in at most one God!”

Yet Judaism is definitely a religion that is filled with references to God, and Jews from the Bible to our own time have done their best to articulate their understandings of God.2 In what follows, I want to zoom out, as it were, to explain the philosophical status of all the understandings of God that Jews have proposed. In doing so, I hope to make clear what, in philosophical language, the “truth-functional status” of any such beliefs is—that is, the way in which, and the degree to which, any claim to affirm or deny a belief in God can claim to be the truth.

Beginning with Ludwig Wittgenstein and especially A. J. Ayer in his book, Language, Truth, and Logic, analytic philosophers in the mid-twentieth century sought to distinguish what they called the “truth-functional” goals of some forms of language—that is, language whose goal is to describe reality—in contrast to the emotional functions of language.3 Moral and religious language, they first asserted, was of the latter sort. Sentences, of course, can also take the form of questions or commands, and later another British philosopher, J. L. Austin, identified yet another function of language—namely, “performative utterances.” Performative utterances use language to do something, to perform a task (hence their name)—for example, “I hereby declare you married.”4 Sentences that ask a question, issue a command, or perform a task are distinct from sentences asserting that x is the case, that x is true not only to our experience of reality but also to objective reality to the extent we can know it. Truth-functional sentences assert a claim to truth—for example, that God exists and is of a certain nature. This latter type of sentence is the subject of this article.

Ayer’s criterion for truth-functional language was that it could be subjected to the “verifiability criterion”—that is, it could be tested empirically. In subsequent decades, though, it became clear that even some scientific terms like “atom” and “quark” could not fit that criterion, and, as such, that his definition of “truth” was too narrow. In what follows, my explanation of what constitutes truth is, as readers will see, expanded to include an accurate description of anything that we experience through our five senses or otherwise, as long as many human beings experience the same phenomenon. (That last criterion distinguishes truth from fantasy or even insanity). So, for example, it is true that parents may feel proud of their children; even though outsiders can see only physical signs of that (smiles, applause, etc.), many parents feel proud of their children on occasion and so can attest that such feelings are real. Similarly, violations of justice, especially egregious ones, are clear to many people, and so we can assert that norms of justice are real, however much we might argue as to what they are and how they should apply to a given case. What will constitute truth in this article, then, is the description of a portion of our experience that most adequately describes it. Because human beings are not omniscient, many such statements will be only partial takes on the full truth, as the following will explain.

Levels of Experience

We human beings experience the world on three different levels. The first is the concrete level that we experience through our five senses. This includes such diverse things as tables, songs, and people.

Even on this level, it is harder than you might first think precisely to define what is, for example, a table. Is it a flat surface with legs? But so is a chair! And what about the tables in restaurant booths that are screwed into the wall and have no legs? If instead of defining a table in terms of its form you want to define it in terms of its function—for example, a table is a surface on which to put things—how is that different from a desk? Or even a floor? At this point we are talking only about a table, where we are pretty confident that we know what we are talking about. What if instead we were talking about a song? How would you differentiate a song from noise, especially given people’s diverse tastes in music and the existence of atonal music? So even on the concrete level, being able to describe precisely what you mean can be difficult. When asked to define many elements of the concrete world and finding it impossible to be precise, one is sorely tempted to give up and fall back on Justice Potter Stewart’s comment about obscenity (in the United States Supreme Court’s case, Jacobellis v. Ohio (378 U.S. 197 [1964]) when he could not define that precisely: “I know it when I see it.”

Defining precisely what you mean becomes even harder on the second level of experience that we humans have, the first level of abstraction. This level includes some very important aspects of our life that have major impacts on its shape and quality but that we do not experience directly with our five senses., although we do see concrete examples of all of these abstract entities. Examples of this level include justice, goodness, truth, beauty, and all of our associations (such as family, friendship, or nationhood). Defining “justice” is the subject of one of the very first books of Western philosophy, Plato’s Republic, and philosophers, jurists, and legislators have struggled to define it in both theory and practice ever since. There are similarly varying theories of truth (such as the correspondence theory versus the coherence theory), and even a broader set of theories about what constitutes beauty. Modern DNA testing has revealed that some of us are related to people we never would have guessed are members of our family. Adopted children and children created through donor sperm or eggs need to differentiate those who are their family genetically in contrast to those who are their family socially, including the ones who put in the time, effort, and resources to raise them. So defining “family” is also more complicated than one might imagine.

It should not be surprising, then, that precise definitions are even more difficult when it comes to the third level of human experience, the second level of abstraction. This is sometimes described as “the transcendent,” or “ultimate reality.” It is often conceived as the container of all of our experiences. Philosophers try to describe it in the area of philosophy known as metaphysics, which Aristotle, in his book, Metaphysics, called “the queen of the sciences.” As is typical for philosophy, the goal of those thinking and writing in metaphysics is descriptive and analytic: What is the phenomenon that we experience? How does it function? and How is it different from, and related to, other phenomena that we experience?

How Religions Differ from Philosophies
in Their Approach to the Levels of Experience

Like philosophy, the religions of the world think deeply about all three levels of human experience, but they do so with a different goal that is captured in the very word “religion.” The “lig” in that word comes from the Latin word ligare, which means “to connect, tie, or bind.” That Latin root also appears in the English word “ligament,” which can be any connection but in medicine is specifically the connective tissue that binds one bone to another; similarly, when a woman has had as many children as she wants, she sometimes has her tubes tied, called medically “a tubal ligation.” Religions, then, etymologically and in practice, are interested not so much in describing and analyzing the three levels of our experience, which are the central goals of philosophy, but rather in fostering our connections to all three levels.

So, in the concrete world, religions concern themselves with creating and shaping our interactions with the environment and the people within it. Some of the ways that religions do this are: (1) rituals to call our attention to, and mark the change of, the seasons and the life cycle and/or to bring us together as families and communities; (2) art, music, literature, and dance to help us make an art of life; (3) stories to articulate our sense of historical connection to our past, present, and future; and (4) moral norms that are taught in educational materials, sermons, and environments (schools, camps, youth groups, and houses of worship) to guide our interactions with each other in every aspect of life and to motivate us to do what we can to eliminate or at least ameliorate the moral problems of everyday life, including (but not limited to) poverty, illness, and prejudice.

On the first level of abstraction, religions provide both materials and formats to bring us together to discuss what a given religious group’s stance should be on moral issues. Among the issues discussed most in religious settings these days are climate change; poverty; prejudice; inequity in housing, education, health care, and jobs; immigration; sexual ethics; business ethics; the proper and improper use of social media; and medical issues at the beginning and end of life. Grappling with such issues in light of each religion’s vision of what is a good human being and a good society, as well as its more concrete articulations of what that vision entails in practice, is a major function of religion.

Another issue on this first level of abstraction is the relationships that a particular religious group should have with other religious and secular groups. Putting it starkly, if we believe that x is true and good, do we have enough humility to believe that other groups who see things differently can nevertheless consist of smart and moral people and deserve to be respected as such—hopefully to the point of entering into respectful dialogue and maybe then mutual action but at least friendly disagreement?

It is on the second level of abstraction that the word “God” appears in religious language. That word is defined in many ways, but two common ones are these: a separate being with a will and personality who created and sustains the universe and who actively interacts with it and cares about it (“theism”), or, alternatively, the force that created the world and sustains it, or that is the world (“deism”). Each of these two major groups has subsets. So, for example, there are rationalists and existentialists among theists, and among deists there are those who think that the world was created in a particular time and is static (for example, Platonists) and those who think that the process of creation is dynamic and ongoing (Aristotelians, including, but not limited to, “process theology”). Religions use the word “God” or some other name or metaphor rather than just saying “the transcendent” or “ultimate reality” because, again, they aim to help us relate to that reality, not just describe or analyze it, and it is much easier to relate to the world if it is imagined in an anthropomorphic image or some other concrete term.

Precisely because we are talking about the second level of abstraction, precise descriptions of that ultimate reality, let alone precise definitions of it, are not just difficult, but impossible. That is expressed in theological language as God being “holy”—that is, wholly other than anything we human beings can comprehend. It is important to state clearly that recognizing God as holy should not stop us from learning whatever we can about the world on all three levels of experience that we have of it. On the contrary, if God created the world, then learning more about it through the various relevant sciences is also learning more about God’s plan for us who live in it. So the recognition of God’s holiness should not deter us from studying all aspects of the world that affect us or from trying to live in it more robustly through whatever changes we make, taking into account, as we must, the need to preserve the world as well as to manipulate it for our purposes. While doing that, though, the recognition of God’s holiness should make us aware of the awesome nature of the universe, our dependence on it, and our inability to comprehend it all, thus fostering in us a sense of humility and gratitude.

God’s holiness should also inspire us to live a righteous life. Leviticus 19 makes this clear: one of the opening verses, with “you” and “shall be” in the plural and so addressed to the entire People of Israel, asserts: “You shall be holy, as I, the Lord, your God, am holy” (verse 2). That verse serves as a header for the rest of the chapter, which defines what holiness entails, including respect for parents, taking care of the poor, having honest weights and measures, coming to the rescue of those in distress, observing one day a week as Shabbat so that work does not become an idol, refraining from vengeance and bearing a grudge and instead reproving someone who needs rebuke, and, ultimately, “Love your neighbor as yourself” (verse 18). As a society, we should strive to become “a kingdom of priests and a holy nation” (Exodus 19:6). So the point of relating to God is not just to gain knowledge; it is to model ourselves after God and thus become better individuals and communities.

We find it easier to relate to God—that is, the transcendent element of our experience, ultimate reality—through metaphors that make it possible for us not only to understand what we can, but also to relate to it, and so the Bible itself refers to God in many ways. One is the generic word “god” (’el or ’elohim in Hebrew) and God’s proper name: (the Tetragrammaton, which is written as the four Hebrew letters, yod, heh, vav, heh but is pronounced as Adonai, “my Lord,” as a matter of respect, much as we call our parents “Mother” and “Father” or the affectionate “Mom” or “Dad” rather than by their proper names). In addition to these generic and proper names for God, the Bible refers to God through multiple metaphors, as, for example, Father and Creator (Deuteronomy 32:6), Sun and Shield (Psalm 84:11); and eight metaphors in two consecutive verses (Psalm 18:2–3): “I adore you, O Lord (the Tetragrammaton), my strength, my crag, my fortress, my rescuer, my God, my rock in whom I seek refuge, my shield, my mighty champion, my haven.” (verses 2–3). Then, of course, there is the famous verse, “The Lord is my shepherd…” (Psalm 23:1). These are all partial windows into the nature of God. The classical rabbis aptly name this higher level of abstraction “the Place” (hamaqom), asserting that “the Holy Blessed One is the place of His universe, but His universe is not His place” (Genesis Rabbah 68:9)—namely, that God encompasses space, but space does not encompass God.

What Belief in God Means

What does it mean, then, not to believe in God? It could mean that one is blind to the third level of abstraction altogether, that one lives one’s life on the concrete level alone or perhaps also on the first level of abstraction. Alternatively, it could mean that one experiences the second level of abstraction, but it does not matter much in a given person’s life. Most often, it means that someone identifies God with a particular metaphor or vision of God that has not panned out in his or her life, especially when they prayed to God for something that did not happen and then become an agnostic or atheist because that particular understanding of God did not materialize. In those cases, one may want to rethink the ways in which one understands God rather than ignore or deny one’s experience of transcendence. In particular, as the classical rabbis already assert, a prayer to reverse something that has already happened is a vain prayer (m. Berakhot 9:3). They also assert that we may not depend on miracles in the sense of violations of the laws of nature (b. Qiddushin 39b), so we should not expect prayers that such miracles occur to be fulfilled. That is very different from our daily prayer in the Amidah to thank God for “Your miracles that are daily with us,” where the “miracles” are the very laws of nature that enable us to live and function. The word “miracle” in this context means something that is awesome and should not be taken for granted.

Conversely, what does it mean to believe in God? It is to be aware of the second level of abstraction and to make it an important part of how one understands oneself and lives one’s life. The metaphors by which one refers to that level of experience (how one conceives of God) and the patterns of action that are motivated by that experience will undoubtedly change over time and as one gains experience with all levels of experience.

Martin Buber made an important distinction between “belief that” something is the case, which he called “p-faith” from the Greek word pistis, “knowledge,” in contrast to “belief in” something or someone, which he called “e-faith” from the Hebrew word emunah, meaning “trust.”5 Adopting his distinction, along the lines that I described in the introduction to this essay, I would say that in Christianity and Islam, belief in God, while involving matters of trust, is primarily a matter of assertions that the world and anything beyond it is of a particular nature, articulated in their beliefs, respectively, that Jesus is Christ or that Muhammad is God’s ultimate prophet. Judaism certainly has beliefs—for example, that God is one, that the Written and Oral Torahs articulate what God wants of us, that the People Israel are in Covenant with God—but Judaism does not define itself or who is a Jew in terms of an official statement of beliefs that one must assert to be Jewish. As noted above, Rabbi Louis Jacobs has demonstrated that when a variety of rabbis during the Middle Ages, influenced by the Muslims and Christians among whom they lived, formulated lists of beliefs that they thought defined Judaism, those lists were reformulated and reinterpreted by later rabbis, and so no such formulation became authoritative.6 Instead, in Judaism e-faith is dominant, so that belief in God is primarily a statement that one’s experience of the transcendent, the second level of abstraction, can be trusted to be real and true, and that one should therefore live one’s life with humility, gratitude, morality, and aspirations for holiness.

Rabbi Elliot N. Dorff, Ph.D. is Rector and Distinguished Service Professor of Philosophy at American Jewish University and Visiting Professor at UCLA School of Law.


1 See, respectively, Louis Jacobs, Principles of Jewish Faith: An Analytical Study (New York: Basic, 1964); Joseph Albo, Sefer HaIkkarim: Book of Principles, trans. Isaac Husik (Philadelphia, PA: Jewish Publication Society, 1946); and Ḥasdai Crescas, “The Light of the Lord,” in Physics and Metaphysics in Hasdai Crescas, trans. Warren Zev Harvey (Amsterdam: J. C. Gieben, 1998), book 2, part 6, chapter 1.

2 Recent collections of what some Jewish thinkers have written about God include, in chronological order of publication: Susannah Heschel, On Being a Jewish Feminist: A Reader (New York: Schocken, 1983), part 3; Elliot N. Dorff and Louis E. Newman, eds., Contemporary Jewish Theology: A Reader (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); Daniel H. Frank, Oliver Leaman, and Charles H. Manekin, eds., The Jewish Philosophy Reader (London: Routledge, 2000); Elyse Goldstein, ed., New Jewish Feminism: Probing the Past, Forging the Future (Woodstock, VT: Jewish Lights, 2009), part 1; Elliot Cosgrove, ed., Jewish Theology in Our Time: A New Generation Explores the Foundations and Future of Jewish Belief (Woodstock, VT: Jewish Lights, 2010); and Richard Agler and Rifat Sonsino, eds., A God We Can Believe In. (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2022).

3 A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic (London: Gallanz, 1936) and republished several times since. Alfred (“Freddie”) Jules Ayer (1910–89) was Jewish, and Rabbi Louis Jacobs told me that they were good friends.

4 J. L. Austin, Sense and Sensibilia (Oxford: Clarendon, 1962) and Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Oxford: Clarendon, 1962). For a short description of this theory and its later philosophical developments, including a number of examples of performative utterances in a wide variety of areas of life, see “Performative Utterances,” Encyclopedia.com, https://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/performative-utterances. As Rabbi David Fine has told me, the same distinction is used by anthropologists; see, e.g., D. S. Gardner, “Performativity in Ritual: The Mianmin Case,” Man n.s. 18, no. 2 (1983), 346–60, which refers to a number of other articles on this in its opening paragraph. For an example of how one’s categorization of a sentence as performative or descriptive can make an important legal difference, see my responsum, Elliot N. Dorff, “A Second Wedding Ceremony,” Rabbinical Assembly, https://www.rabbinicalassembly.org/sites/default/files/2021-07/A%20Second%20Wedding%20Ceremony.pdf.

5 Martin Buber, Two Types of Faith (New York: Macmillan, 1951), also (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1951).

6 See note 1 above.

Categories
Vol. 67, No. 1 (Winter 2022-23)

Intimations of Mortality (pdf)

Download PDF

Download PDF